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ABSTRACT 
In the United States, the issue of immigration, particularly illegal immigration, 
has had significant implications for national security, the political landscape, culture, and 
the U.S. economy. Current U.S. regulations and enforcement practices are clearly 
ineffective to meet the challenges surrounding the ending or containment of illegal 
immigration. Meanwhile, the issue of illegal immigration attracts even more attention and 
demonstrates the United States’ apparent inability to deal effectively with the problem. In 
2011, a surge of unaccompanied children (under age 18) coming illegally from Mexico, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras were apprehended by U.S. immigration agencies 
at the U.S.–Mexico border.  
This thesis takes a two-part approach to focus on the ongoing rise in 
unaccompanied children, starting with a brief explanation of why children leave their 
home countries and how they get to the U.S.–Mexico border, following with the United 
States’ reaction to the recent surge in unaccompanied children. We ask if the United 
States is doing enough to address the problem of rising numbers of unaccompanied 
children in the context of changes and continuities in the Department of Homeland 
Security’s wider approach to illegal immigration. The solution requires policy reform that 
properly addresses socio-economic and security conditions in the region. This is done in 
an effort to produce a viable set of policy recommendations that lay out why the United 
States needs to do more, and what it needs to do in order to have an impact on the issue 
of unaccompanied children specifically and illegal immigration more generally.  
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Beginning in 2011, the U.S. media began broadcasting reports about the massive 
immigration of undocumented and unaccompanied children (under the age of 18) from 
Latin America. Pictures of child refugees created political tension in the United States.1 
Most had entered the United States via the Mexican border, traveling by train, motor 
vehicle, and/or by foot.2 Many of the children had no knowledge of the risks and 
consequences they would face by undertaking the journey north, and their arrival has 
challenged the capacity of the United States to respond appropriately. From fiscal year 
(FY) 2012, the number of unaccompanied children entering into the U.S. immigration 
system rose to 15,701—multiplying in numbers from earlier years.3 These numbers 
continued to rise in FY2013 with the referral of 24,120 children by the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of 
Refugee Resettlement (ORR).4 Following FY2013, there have been record numbers of 
children apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol agents. Significant numbers of the children 
have legitimate cases for political asylum or different types of alleviation; but the 
majority are fundamentally motivated by financial concern and a yearning to reconnect 
with relatives.5 Yet, are economic and family reconnection the primary reasons for the 
surge? This thesis explores why we are seeing unaccompanied alien children (UAC) 
between the ages of 6 and 17 coming to the United States and what the United States is 
doing once the children are apprehended.  
UAC, as defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, “are persons under 18 
without a parent or legal guardian in the United States who is able to provide care and 
                                                 
1 Marc R. Rosenblum, Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension between 
Protection and Prevention (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2015), 6.  
2 Maricela Garcia, “Unaccompanied Children in the United States: Challenges and Opportunities” 
2008, http://www.latinopolicyforum.org/resources/document/Unaccompanied-Children-Article.pdf, 2. 
3 Administration for Children and Families, “Fact Sheet,” 2014, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/orr/orr_uc_updated_fact_sheet_1416.pdf.  
4 Ibid.  
5 Rosenblum, Unaccompanied Child Migration, 2.  
2 
physical custody.”6 Once a person reaches the age of 18, he or she no longer falls under 
the UAC definition. According to the numbers provided by the U.S. Border Patrol, 
Mexican children are the largest group of children apprehended.7 The data also shows 
that, although Mexico has high numbers of unaccompanied children crossing the border, 
the numbers have remained constant from 2011–2014, and Mexican numbers remain 
almost the same when compared to the number of children coming from Honduras, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador. As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, the number of 
unaccompanied children from these three countries had increased more than 13-fold, 
from 3,933 in 2011 to 51,705 in 2014 between the ages of 8 to 17.8 The Department of 
Homeland Security’s apprehension data also highlights that from FY 2011–2014, the 
majority of the minors were apprehended at a specific crossing sector of the U.S.–Mexico 
border—the Rio Grande Valley—even though the border has nine different crossing 
sectors. Figure 2 shows the numbers divided among the different crossing sectors, and 
Figure 3 highlights the location of the highest number of children apprehended by U.S. 
Border Patrol agents.  
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Justice, “Immigration Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien Children” 
(Washington, DC: Executive Office of Immigration Review, 2004), https://www.immigrantjustice.org/
sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
EOIR%20guideline%20on%20Children%20in%20immigration%20court.pdf, 3.  
7 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children FY 2016,” 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-
unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.  
8 The numbers of unauthorized alien children from Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
were provided by U.S. Border Patrol, “United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and 
Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016,” U.S. Border Patrol, 2016, 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children.  
3 
Figure 1.  Unaccompanied Children Apprehended by Country Reported by 
U.S. Border Patrol Agents 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied 
Alien Children FY 2016,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016, 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-
2016.  
Table 1.   Unaccompanied Children Apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol on the 
U.S.–Mexico Border 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied.” https://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.  
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
El Salvador 1221 1910 1394 3314 5990 16404 9389 5017
Guatemala 1115 1517 1565 3835 8068 17057 13589 6474
Honduras 968 1017 974 2997 6747 18244 5409 2772
Mexico 16114 13724 11768 13974 17240 15634 11012 2881
4 
Figure 2.  Number of Children Apprehended by Border Patrol Sector 
 
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien 
Children FY 2016,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2016, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.   
Figure 3.  U.S.–Mexico Borderlands Showing South Texas–Northern Mexico 
Study Emphasis 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Service, “U.S.–Mexico Border Environmental Health Initiative 
(Geology Component),” U.S. Geological Service, last modified March 25, 2014, 
http://gec.cr.usgs.gov/projects/borderstudies/health.html.  
The high number of apprehensions (especially in the Rio Grande Valley) of 
unaccompanied children at the southern border started surging in 2011 and peaked in 
2014. These children were primarily from the Northern Triangle—Honduras, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador. Then, the number of apprehensions declined sharply in the winter of 
5 
2014; however, this decline only lasted for a few months. In the summer of 2015, the 
numbers show a significant resurgence in apprehensions of undocumented children. 
Table 1 shows the numbers for FY2016, although only covering a three-month period 
(October 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015), clearly demonstrate that there is already 
a significant increase for this fiscal year. A comparison of the apprehension numbers of 
the same three-month period in FY16 with that period in FY15 show a 217 percent 
increase in the FY16 period; there were 17,370 apprehensions in FY16 as compared to 
the same period in FY15, which had 7,987.9 Although the drop in child arrivals starting 
in 2014 has led some to believe that the regional migration crisis had been resolved, these 
more recent data are a reminder that humanitarian and migration pressures in the 
Northern Triangle remain a major concern.10 Huge efforts committed by the Northern 
Triangle countries, Mexico, and the United States have contributed to the recent decline; 
however, these efforts only seemed to be effective for a short period. Many attribute this 
to a period of adjustment to smugglers looking for new ways to conduct their operations. 
Whether the numbers are rising or declining, the majority of the children apprehended are 
still coming through a single crossing point across the border in the eastern portion of the 
U.S.–Mexico border. The children’s decision to choose a specific geographical crossing 
point must be understood in order to mitigate future migration flows. What is the United 
States doing to address this problem?  
A. POLICY 
Prior to 2008, children apprehended at the border were returned to their home 
countries immediately; however, the 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act, enacted under President George W. Bush to combat child 
trafficking, requires UACs from Central America must be given a court hearing before 
                                                 
9 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children.”  
10 Marc R. Rosenblum and Isabel Ball, “Trend in Unaccompanied Child and Family Migration from 
Central America” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2016), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/
research/trends-unaccompanied-child-and-family-migration-central-america, 2.  
6 
they are either extradited or permitted to stay.11 Many of the minors apprehended during 
the surge in 2011 were from Mexico and the Northern Triangle.12 Children from the 
Northern Triangle accounted for 74 percent of the minors detained.13 In coordination 
with Mexican authorities, Mexican child immigrants, unlike children of other 
nationalities, are sent back quickly across the border upon detection by Border Patrol 
agents14 without a court hearing before an immigration judge.15 However, screening 
processes must be applied equally to all children no matter the location from where they 
are coming. This practice of treating children from specific countries differently 
undermines the possibility of equal treatment and benefits for all children, and it provides 
an incentive for Northern Triangle children attempting to stay in that they know they will 
be granted a hearing that could result in their favor.  
Child migration from Mexico and the Northern Triangle has been the subject of 
considerable debate in the United States in the recent years, and immigration has been 
one of the main political topics during the United States presidential campaign. For 
instance, Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson testified, “Unaccompanied 
children migration serves as a warning sign that the serious and longstanding challenges 
in Central America are worsening.”16 The root causes of insecurity and instability must 
be addressed, not only for the benefit of the countries involved, but for the security of the 
United States as well.  
                                                 
11 Alan Greenblatt, “What’s Causing the Latest Immigration Crisis? A Brief Explainer,” NPR, July 9, 
2014, http://www.npr.org/2014/07/09/329848538/whats-causing-the-latest-immigration-crisis-a-brief-
explainer.  
12 Ian Gordon, “70,000 Kids Will Show Up Alone at Our Border This Year. What Happens to 
Them?,” Mother Jones, July–August 2014, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/child-migrants-
surge-unaccompanied-central-america.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Nina Lakhani, “Mexico Deports Record Numbers of Women and Children in US-driven Effort,” 
The Guardian, February 4, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/04/mexico-deports-record-
numbers-women-children-central-america.  
15 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, The Lost Dream: Unaccompanied Migrant Children and 
Victims of Human Trafficking on the US/Mexico Border (Washington, DC: U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops, 2006), 5.  
16 “Unaccompanied Alien Children: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy, United States House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs,” 113th 
Cong. (2014), (statement of Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
U.S. Department of State), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=760578.  
7 
This thesis analyzes some of the factors associated with Latin American 
children’s decisions (sometimes made by parents) to migrate from their home countries 
and cross the U.S.–Mexico border to journey to the United States. The study utilizes the 
technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) method for 
determining the ideal geographical crossing point based on the criteria selected. The 
results strongly support the data provided by the U.S. Border Patrol, which identifies the 
Rio Grande Valley (U.S. side of the border, Tamaulipas/Nuevo Leon on the Mexico side) 
as the geographical crossing point most used by unaccompanied minors from Latin 
America. With a better understanding of how children move from their home countries to 
the United States, and how is the United States approaching the problem once children 
are apprehended, the United States can work with the countries involved (i.e., Mexico, 
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador) to develop a regional strategy to reduce and control 
the flow of unaccompanied children coming to the United States.  
B. CHAPTER REVIEW 
This study is based on secondary (and open) sources, including sources from the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS). Other sources include Mexican news, journals, and books about Central American 
history, gangs, organized crime, and violence. Also, Internet websites from the 
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, 
Department of Justice, and other organizations were reviewed.  
The main goal of this thesis is to determine whether the United States’ actions to 
address the problem are  enough, or if a targeted and comprehensive political solution 
must be developed in order to find a solution. The thesis covers sequential steps of events 
that start at each country from the Northern Triangle, the passage through Mexico, and 
finally the decision to cross into the United States. Once inside the United States, children 
are apprehended and taken through a process that is vaguely understood and involves 
detention and a possible deportation process. This chapter introduced the problem with 
actual numbers of children apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol agents and the border 
location where the apprehensions are happening. 
8 
Chapter II explains some of the factors contributing to the children’s decision to 
migrate from their home countries and covers each country’s political overview prior to 
the surge, violence levels, and geographical control. From these factors, the Northern 
Triangle and Mexico countries emerge as facing one common threat: transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs). The threat is very powerful and violent, which causes 
many citizens, including children, to leave their countries looking for better opportunities. 
In the chapter, the TCOs’ powerful operations are covered, along with their associations 
for conducting organized crime activities. The chapter reveals the impunity of these 
groups, which weakens state institutions, is allowing them to expand operations into other 
lucrative operations, such as people smuggling. 
Chapter III begins by describing the initial journey north from the children’s 
home countries, the methods used to travel through Mexico, and the decision to cross a 
specific geographical crossing point at the U.S.–Mexico border. The TOPSIS 
methodology is utilized to determine if, after analyzing a series of criteria, the decision to 
cross a specific geographical location through the U.S.–Mexico border matches with the 
location chosen by the majority of the children apprehended. 
Chapter IV presents the study data and the results gathered from the TOPSIS 
process. The results matched with the location where the majority of the unaccompanied 
children are getting apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol agents.  
Chapter V explores the apprehension process once children cross the border and 
are confronted by U.S. immigration authorities. It follows the procedures in terms of the 
immigration agencies’ responsibilities and the different legal options available for 
children apprehended at the U.S.–Mexico border.  
Chapter VI explains the status of detention and current policy affecting the 
apprehension of unaccompanied alien children. The chapter details the process that 
unfolds once children are screened by U.S. Border Patrol agents and transferred to a 
detention facility.  
9 
Chapter VII concludes with a summary of research findings and provides 
recommendations for countering unaccompanied child migration from the Northern 
Triangle and Mexico.  
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II. WHERE ARE THESE CHILDREN COMING FROM? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the majority of unaccompanied children apprehended at the U.S.–
Mexico border come from Mexico and three Central American countries—Guatemala, 
Honduras, and El Salvador. There are many explanations in the literature for the 2011 
surge of apprehensions noted in the previous chapter; however, the two top reasons are 
escaping violence and the need for better economic opportunities. Throughout interviews 
with detained children conducted by the Center of Inter-American Studies, aspiration for 
a better future was uncovered as a greater driver for the migration than poverty and 
absence of work.17 According to another report conducted by the Women’s Refugee 
Commission, gang violence, corruption, and failure of governance are key factors in 
children’s decision to migrate. The report reveals, “Staying in their country would 
guarantee death, and making the dangerous journey would give them a chance to 
survive.”18 Within the context of violence, many would argue that establishing security in 
these countries would have a positive impact on reducing children migration. However, 
why is providing security and a better environment for children and the population as a 
whole so difficult for these countries? The answer is it is a matter of control, specifically 
“turf control” of ungoverned spaces.19  
What are ungoverned spaces? The term was derived from the state-focused 
conceptualization of regions wherein states do not practice successful power; the state 
control is missing, feeble, or challenged.20 Also, it is in the contested areas with which 
                                                 
17 Anita Khashu, “Children in Transit: Results of Interviews with Central American Unaccompanied 
Minors Encountered in Mexico” (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios y Programas Interamericanos [Center of 
Inter-American Studies and Programs], 2010), http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_papers/
21KHASHU.pdf, 17.  
18 Women’s Refugee Commission, “Forced From Home: The Lost Boys and Girls of Central 
America,” Women’s Refugee Commission, 2012, https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/
zdocs/document?id=844-forced-from-home-the-lost-boys-and-girls-of-central-america, 7.  
19 Turf control refers to the ownership of a specific transit area, route, or territory utilized to conduct 
criminal activity without being challenged by the state government.  
20 Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an 
Era of Softened Sovereignty (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 17. 
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countries in the Northern Triangle struggle. In the Northern Triangle and Mexico, 
ungoverned spaces are simply “differently governed.”21 These regions have been 
deliberately or automatically surrendered in whole or parts to actors other than the 
pertinent legitimately perceived sovereign powers.22 Therefore, ungoverned spaces are 
very volatile in terms of providing security to the population in such areas and leave that 
responsibility to whoever has the bigger muscle to control.  
Each country in Latin America has its own specific challenges. If security is not 
established throughout Latin America, strong governance and institutions capable of 
maintaining control over countries’ territories will be very difficult to develop. Honduras, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico are fighting against very powerful enemies—
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). These groups—cartels, gangs, and 
organized crime mafias—operate and dominate local territory in both urban and rural 
settings.23 Once these groups challenge the state institutions, the fight for control ensues, 
and in many instances the TCOs win. As Saul Elbein writes about the situation in 
Guatemala, “The governmental Guatemala has no control over, by some counts, half of 
its territory. There is near total impunity for murder.”24 Violence in Guatemala and the 
other countries discussed in this thesis has grown out of control, and smuggling routes are 
found running through the areas disputed by the groups associated with criminal activity. 
When criminal groups own a territory, the citizens tend to rely on their own means of 
protecting themselves, taking into their own hands responsibility of the absent 
government. For the rich, this often means employing private security; for the poor, it 
generally means participation in or support of vigilante activity.25 The enemy is too 
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powerful for citizens to cope with, which makes many citizens, including children, leave 
their countries looking for better and safer opportunities.  
Although transnational criminal organizations could be composed of any of these 
groups—cartels, gangs, and organized crime mafias—gangs are the only ones about 
which some authors have questioned the use of the TCO label. For example, in the article 
“Creating Folks Devils,” Sonja Wolf argues, “Street gangs lack the organizational skills, 
well-defined leadership, specialized roles, and relationships with legitimate institutions 
that characterize organize crime.”26 In contrast and related to the unaccompanied children 
migration, this thesis explores how the connection of street gangs and cartels can develop 
networks across country borders, which is one of the reasons that the TCO label does fit. 
Though some street level gangs may not be extremely organized, there are bigger gangs 
that are; therefore, it is important to understand that some gangs have the operational 
reach and capacity to conduct cross border/states activities and should be labeled as 
TCOs. To be successful, TCOs resort to violence, which is the preferred method utilized 
by street gangs found in the Northern Triangle, Mexico, and the United States. Children 
from these areas are fleeing countries so violent that they and their parents view the 
prospect of a dangerous journey to the United States as more appealing than staying at 
home. Analysis of the events that occurred in each country prior to the surge of migrating 
unaccompanied children provides a background for the children’s decision to leave—
escaping violence.  
B. MEXICO 
Mexico, politically speaking, is relatively the most stable country of the countries 
discussed; however, child migration from Mexico to the United States is still a huge 
issue. In 2009, of all unaccompanied children apprehended at the U.S.–Mexico border, 
around 82 percent were from Mexico, and 18 percent from the Northern Triangle 
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(Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador).27 However, the numbers completely changed 
after 2011, when only 23 percent came from Mexico, and the other 77 percent from the 
Northern Triangle.28 This drastic change in percentages is related to an effective 
anticrime strategy introduced by the former Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2006–
2012). The strategy called for more U.S.–Mexico security cooperation missions resulting 
in the arrest of some drug kingpins; however, more than 60,000 people were killed in the 
process of the strategy enforcement due to organize crime-related violence during his 
term.29 These facts undermined the government’s achievements, and after the global 
financial crisis of 2009, Mexico’s security challenges grew due to economic hardship.  
Mexico is currently ranked at 18 for murder rate in countries not at war, and 
although it ranks higher than the Northern Triangle countries, security is a big concern 
within Mexican borders. Many scholars would argue that Mexico is at war with criminal 
networks. When compared to the United States, ranked at number 42 in murder rates, 
Mexico is relatively high. Figure 4 shows the murder rate per 100,000 residents from 
2009–2012 in Mexico. From 2009 to 2012, Mexico has maintained its ranking, 
approximately five murders per day. The majority of the murders are related to organized 
crime and, in particular, to drug cartels.  
To fight the cartels, the Mexican government and the United States have 
increased cooperation through a joint security plan called the Merida Initiative. The 
initiative was first funded in 2008 and has provided over $1.5 billion to Mexico since 
then. The current focus of the program is on “disrupting organized criminal groups, 
institutionalizing the rule of law, creating a 21st-century border, and building solid and 
flexible communities.”30 The U.S. government has guaranteed to battle weapons 
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trafficking, tax evasion, and drug demand; Mexico has guaranteed to battle corruption.31 
Unfortunately, the problem still remains even after President Felipe Calderon left office 
and was replaced by current President Enrique Pena Nieto, who has continued the fight 
against criminal organizations. The cartels continue to dominate the territory in which 
they operate, and the decision between the government’s weak institutions or the cartel’s 
threats of plata o plomo32 is very difficult for the population.  
Figure 4.  Mexico’s Homicide Rate per 100,000 Residents 2009–2012  
 
Adapted from “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People),” World Bank, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?page=1.  
C. HONDURAS 
The political scenario in Honduras was highlighted by a 2009 military coup that 
ousted President Manuel Zelaya and sent him off into exile in Costa Rica. After the coup, 
the de facto government suspended civil liberties and initiated a curfew after protesters 
demanded Zelaya’s return and reinstatement.33 Even though the policies of Zelaya’s 
government were not very effective against criminal organizations, the public was very 
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upset by changing government in a non-democratic fashion. By 2009, Honduras’s 
Caribbean coast had become a major transshipment location for drug trafficking, and 
organized crime had infiltrated government itself. In Understanding Central America, the 
authors estimate that 30 percent of cops had connections to organized crime and that 
more than half of police investigative unit personnel cooperated with Mexican narcotics 
cartels.34 
Honduras is known as the murder capital of the world, and it is ranked number 
one in murder rates for countries not at war. In 2011 alone, Honduras had approximately 
20–25 murders per day; the disparity between Honduras and the United States is high and 
increasing (shown in Figure 5). The majority of these murders are related to organized 
crime and to cartels, in particular, and youth gangs.  
Figure 5.  Honduras’s Homicide Rate per 100,000 Residents 2009–2012 
Adapted from “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People),” World Bank, 2016, http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5?page=1.  
As previously stated, due to the pressure from Mexico’s security forces on cartels, 
these crime organizations have established roots in nearby countries in which governance 
is not strong. Honduras is seen as a “business friendly” environment for cartels to 
34 Ibid., 224.  
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operate. In addition to cartels, Honduras is frequently cited as being home of the largest 
number of gang members, particularly the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (18th 
Street) gangs.35 Confirming the exact number of gang members in a specific region is a 
very difficult task due to the flow of individuals through national borders. There is a 
persistent back-and-forth migration of members between Honduras, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States, which is ideal to conduct trafficking 
operations.36 As of today, the Honduran government is still trying to lower the violence 
levels created by the cartel and gang members; however, due to the power of these 
groups, it has been a very difficult task. Many civilians who caught in the middle flee, 
looking for better opportunities somewhere else.  
D. EL SALVADOR  
El Salvador’s political history is characterized by the civil war between 1980 and 
1992. During the civil war, Salvadoran emigration to the United States increased 
dramatically. By 2004, an estimated 1.5 million Salvadorans lived in the United States.37 
Many Salvadorans stated that the real problem in El Salvador, as in the rest of Central 
America, is extreme maldistribution of resources and elite control.38 The maldistribution 
of resources, control of the elites, and emigration have been contributing components in 
the weakening of the family, which has left youthful Salvadorans defenseless against the 
developing gang culture. Also, the repatriation of gang members to El Salvador by the 
United States in the mid-1990s fueled the rise in post-war violence.39  
Though a significantly smaller country than Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala, 
El Salvador holds ranks second for murder rate for countries not at war. If compared to 
the United States, which has about 16 murders per day, El Salvador is a very violent 
place, with about 35 murders per day (see Figure 6). For the most part, gangs are 
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considered responsible of no less than 60 percent of all manslaughters committed in El 
Salvador. The country is dominated by the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Calle 
Dieciocho or Barrio 18 (18th Street Gang).40 Some argue that the local gang problem is 
largely fed by gang members deported from the United States, who connect with their 
peers in El Salvador, causing escalations in the crime rate. Observers argue that gang’s 
historical roots, volume, and the nature of criminal involvement, not necessarily the 
returning gang members, have caused the crime rate to escalate.41 Regardless of the 
reasons, the high levels of violence in El Salvador create a problem for the civilian 
population, forcing many of them to migrate and risk their life looking for a better future. 
Figure 6.  El Salvador Homicide Rate per 100,000 Residents 2009–2012  
 
Adapted from World Bank, “Intentional Homicides per 100,000 People.”  
E. GUATEMALA 
As El Salvador, Guatemala also suffered from a long civil war (1954–1996) that 
has had lasting political consequences. On December 29, 1996, the government signed 
the Peace Accord in Guatemala City, ending the civil war; however, even though a 
democratic regime emerged, Guatemala’s political party system has continued to be 
unstable in the subsequent decades. For instance, there were 19 presidential nominees in 
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1995, and 10 or more for elections through 2011.42 These events demonstrate the 
weakness of the government as no candidate has any continuity or longevity to establish a 
political agenda with goals to benefit the population.  
Although homicide rates dropped in Guatemala from 2009 to 2012, the numbers 
still show high levels of violence. The country ranks fourth in murder rates for countries 
not at war. Figure 7 shows the difference between murder rates in Guatemala and the 
United States.  
Figure 7.  Guatemala’s Homicide Rate per 100,000 Residents 2009–2012  
 
Adapted from World Bank, “Intentional Homicides per 100,000 People.”  
Similar to the elite in El Salvador, Guatemala’s elite control the majority of the 
country’s wealth. The wealthiest 20 percent of the country’s people own two-thirds of its 
wealth, whereas the poorest 20 percent receive only 3 percent.43 Poverty and inequality 
causes grievances in the population, which in many cases results in violence. Violence is 
generally limited to gang rivalry. Responsible for these violent acts are the MS-13 and 
the 18th Street gangs. According to an assessment by U.S. Agency for International 
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Development (USAID), these two gangs constituted 95 percent of all gang membership 
in Guatemala in 2006.44 Poverty and violence provide a great recruiting tool for gangs, 
cartels, and organized crime organizations, and it also may create a strong incentive for 
people to migrate and build a life elsewhere.  
F. VIOLENCE: A COMMON FACTOR IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND 
MEXICO 
Violence, caused by vulnerabilities affecting the region, is a common factor 
throughout the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico. The United Nations published a 
report in 2007 detailing common vulnerabilities, including the geography, 
underdevelopment, low criminal justice capacity, a history of conflict, and drug 
trafficking, affecting these countries.45 In addition, these vulnerabilities combine to 
promote a “business friendly” environment for criminal activity throughout the region.46 
The ability to conduct illicit businesses, mainly drug/weapons trafficking and human 
smuggling/trafficking operations, without fear of prosecution allows criminals to 
challenge the power of each state in maintaining order. A key characteristic of these illicit 
businesses is that they are very lucrative. According to a report on black market human 
smuggling costs, people pay an average of $7,000 to be smuggled into the United States 
from Guatemala and around $4,000 from Mexico.47 If we multiply 50,000 (yearly 
number average of unaccompanied children [UAC] apprehended) by $7,000, the result is 
$350 million a year. Drugs provide an even greater return as drug traffickers can buy a 
kilo of cocaine for $1,500 (wholesale) from Colombia, and it is then sold in the United 
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States for $66,000 (retail).48 This is definitely a business of supply and demand; South 
America has the product and the United States the consumers. For this particular aspect, 
the Northern Triangle and Mexico are placed geographically between drug supply and 
drug demand.49 The big question about this dilemma is: who takes the profit of these 
lucrative illegal businesses?  
According to the literature, various factors affect the violence in Central America 
and Mexico. Most of these factors are related to profit from illegal businesses and who 
get them. Mexican drug cartels, local drug trafficking organizations, transnational youth 
gangs, and other criminal networks are responsible for the poor security environment that 
regular citizens experience.50  
In Mexico, vast territories are controlled by Mexican cartels. Figure 8, illustrates 
the amount of territorial influence from the Sinaloa and Los Zetas Mexican cartels; 
together they control the majority of all Mexican territory. In contrast, moving down 
from Mexico to the Northern Triangle, the territories in Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador are mainly control by youth gangs. The most predominant gangs in the Northern 
Triangle are the MS-13 and the 18th Street gangs, both of which originated in Los 
Angeles and have become the most important gangs in the Northern Triangle.51 Another 
group that the literature emphasizes as responsible for violence is the criminal networks. 
Often, these groups are described as involved with neither drug traffickers nor youth 
gangs; rather, these groups are tied to elites and are clandestine and very powerful. As of 
this point, identifying how these criminal network groups interact with each other or what 
if any specific territory they control as related to the other two groups (Mexican cartels 
and youth gangs) is very difficult.52 The violence in these areas comes from the efforts of 
these groups to maintain control of the territory that each has. This phenomenon is widely 
known as “controlling your turf.”  
                                                 
48 Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, “Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is Thriving,” 
Frontline PBS Online, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/math.html.  
49 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America, 25.  
50 Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Responding to Violence in Central America, 5.  
51 Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, Maras, 1.  
52 Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Responding to Violence in Central America, 25. 
22 
Figure 8.  Mexican Cartel’s Zones of Influence 
 
Source: “El Mapa del Narco en Mexico y las Zonas de Influencia de Todos los Carteles 
[Mexican cartel’s zones of influence],” RT, February 26, 2014, https://actualidad.rt.com/
actualidad/view/120930-mapa-narco-mexico-zonas-influencia-carteles.  
During the early 1980s, Colombian drug traffickers decided to pursue more cost 
effective transit routes for drugs in response to a greater interdiction effort by the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency. As a result, the routes shifted from aerial and maritime 
through the Caribbean to ground movement through Central America, Mexico, and 
eventually the United States. Not only did a new route emerge, but because of poverty, a 
great number for foreign and domestic trafficking organizations also blossomed. It is a 
new way of income wherein for every one person arrested, “there was a hundred hungry 
souls eager to take his place.”53 This new route, which primarily moved drugs through 
Mexico into the United States, prompted Mexico to crack down on drug trafficking 
problems, which in turn forced the Mexican drug cartels to re-adjust and expand their 
territories. The Northern Triangle with its weak governments and a bureaucracy, given 
that members of both are easy to bribe, fit the bill as a strategic bridge between supply 
and demand.54 By the early 2000s, the Zetas, the Sinaloas, and the Gulf cartels had 
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moved aggressively into the Northern Triangle; this movement has created a large 
increase in violence. Bunck and Fowler explain about how Mexican cartels conduct 
business though violence:  
If a Mexican trafficker cannot get their way through bribery, then they will 
use violence. If they cannot purchase land or other needed assets; they will 
seize it through violence. If someone betrays them, they will use violence. 
If someone opposes them, including government forces, they will use 
violence.55  
Therefore, throughout the 2000s, violence to maintain control of trafficking routes 
and territory has been the common theme throughout the region. Although violence is 
directed toward everybody, a report from Casa Alianza published in 2006 shows that 40 
percent of children under the age of 18 are caught in the crossfire.56 This is a huge factor 
motivating children to leave their home countries to look for better opportunities in the 
United States. In 2012, the Women’s Refugee Commission published Forced from 
Home: The Lost Boys and Girls of Central America, in which the authors noted many 
children felt that to stay in their native country would mean death whereas the dangerous 
migration journey would at least offer the possibility or chance to survive.57  
After many years of fighting for their respective territories through the use of 
violence, the Mexican cartels, youth gangs, and criminal networks have decided to 
cooperate with one another. These gangs and criminal networks can and do take a variety 
of positions related to the transport networks, working on behalf of Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations, such as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartels. These agreements 
take a tiered structure based on control. Some of the tasks executed on behalf of cartels 
include “protection of cocaine loads moving through Central America, extortion, human 
smuggling, and other criminal activities.”58 Although the Mexican drug cartels have 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 18.  
56 UNODC, Crime and Development in Central America, 55.  
57 Women’s Refugee Commission, Forced From Home, 7.  
58 Douglas Farah and Pamela Phillips, “Central American Gangs and Transnational Criminal 
Organizations: The Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil” (Alexandria, VA: International 
Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013), http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/
20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf, 7.  
24 
integrated the Maras for movement of drug product, it seems that Maras are merely 
contractors working for the cartels. Even though the Maras do not benefit from the 
overall profit, they do receive money from the cartels’ overall profit; paid as a one-of 
payment upon delivery of the product. Figure 9 shows the areas of control and the power 
structure, illustrating that the Mexican cartels are definitely more powerful than any other 
groups in the region. However, in effort to expand their overall influence and earning 
potential, Los Zetas are allowing the Maras to benefit from one very lucrative business—
human smuggling.  
Figure 9.  Territorial Control and Power Structure 
 
Adapted from End Child Detention, “Freedom for the Children of the Northern Triangle,” End 
Child Detention, 2015, http://endchilddetention.org/freedom-for-children-of-the-northern-
triangle/.  
G. LOS ZETAS, MARAS, AND CHILD IMMIGRATION 
Since October 2012, the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control has 
assigned the MS-13 a noteworthy transnational criminal organization label due to the 
group’s involvement in trafficking—drugs, humans, weapons—and other criminal 
25 
activities.59 In addition, under Executive Order 13581, the Zetas cartel has been 
designated as a part of the groups targeted as TCOs. The connection between the Maras 
in the United States and Maras abroad was made possible by a partnership between the 
U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, which successfully 
indicted numerous MS-13 gang members, leading to the designation of the group as 
transnational organized crime.60 Naming the Maras as TCO provided the Department of 
Homeland Security some indication of the gang’s involvement in the human smuggling 
operations, emphasizing the gang’s reach across state’s borders. Also, the designation 
came right after the United States saw a large increase in undocumented and 
unaccompanied children migrants from the Northern Triangle and Mexico showing up at 
the U.S.–Mexico border. Data about the number of children apprehended by U.S. Border 
Patrol show that the majority of the children cross the U.S.–Mexico border utilizing a 
route primarily controlled by Los Zetas. As Figure 8 shows, the Los Zetas cartel’s control 
is mainly on the eastern portion of Mexico. Figure 10 shows the main routes for migrants 
coming to the United States from the Northern Triangle and Mexico.  
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Figure 10.  Migrants’ Main Routes 
 
Source: “Migration Routes through Mexico,” Periodico Internacional, accessed May 7, 
2016, http://www.elperiodico.com/es/graficos/internacional/migraciones-mexico-eeuu-
menores-4650/.  
The routes are known as: the Pacific route, the central route, and the Gulf route. 
The Gulf route is clearly the shortest route from the Northern Triangle to the United 
States. Based on interviews with gang members, Los Zetas and the MS-13 have reached 
an agreement to conduct human trafficking; where all the middle smugglers (polleros or 
coyotes) use the routes controlled by Los Zetas are MS-13 members, making this 
agreement a real alliance in the human smuggling networks across the region between 
these two groups.61 Although the connection with children migration to the United States 
between Los Zetas and MS-13 is difficult to prove, there is significant evidence that the 
Maras are branching out into arms and human smuggling and that they are benefiting 
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from the violent situation that they have created throughout the region.62 As these groups 
begin to work together, profit and power increases, making counter operation efforts even 
more difficult for state law enforcement agencies. The Zetas and the Maras are currently 
expanding their business activities, which include a multibillion-dollar-a-year business of 
unlawful immigrant smuggling;63 those who use their services are guaranteed a 
successful passage to the United States while facing minimal problems along the way. 
The primary beneficiaries of these services are families sending their children alone to 
avoid violence and any problems along the journey; they are these groups’ main 
customers.  
H. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Both similarities and differences between the Northern Triangle and Mexico are 
delineated by early history. Many historians agree that the region shares three main 
points: geography, poverty, and ineffective state institutions. Also, the region’s 
geography is located between drug supply and drug demand, and this provides a great 
opportunity for trafficking businesses. Additionally, the region’s poverty levels are 
exacerbated by the elites’ control of most of the countries’ wealth. Furthermore, poverty 
results in income inequality that benefits criminal organizations’ recruiting, intimidation, 
and bribery and that diminishes state legitimacy with its population. Finally, ineffective 
state institutions allow criminals to have freedom of movement and maneuver to control 
their “turf.” This creates distrust in the population as poverty increases, creating a gap 
that criminal groups fill with illegal money.  
Criminals take advantage of the weak state institutions and lack of good 
governance by controlling the ungoverned territory. To dominate, criminals use violence 
to maintain control. The violence levels in these countries are relatively high, and this 
undermines any state efforts to counter it. New threats to democracy and stability have 
also emerged in the last decade as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are struggling 
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with the highest levels of violence in the world.64 These are some of the most important 
aspects of migration, in which criminal groups control the territory occupied by regular 
citizens. Citizens are forced to be a part of the situation or to leave. By leaving, the 
population provides another profitable business (smuggling) to these organizations or 
groups as illustrated by the 2011 surge in child migration.  
The Zetas, after breaking relations with the Gulf cartel (their former bosses) in 
2010, decided to work on their own.65 Although drug trafficking was their main source of 
revenue, the cartels found that human smuggling provides a billion dollar business, and it 
has become another source of revenue. To take advantage of this market, the Zetas 
created a necessary relationship with the Maras, a group already established in the 
countries bordering Mexico. Before the child migration surge in 2011, migrants were 
travelling in relatively small groups in order to avoid detection; however, after 2011, 
huge groups of children began showing up at the U.S.–Mexico border. The only reason 
for this sudden change is that some organization (e.g., Maras) was providing protection 
along the routes, while other groups (e.g., Los Zetas) benefitted from tariffs paid by 
smugglers utilizing their territory. As noted in Chapter III, the routes taken by UACs are 
presented to reinforce this claim.  
Violence and poverty remain a constant on the region, and this pushes children 
and families to migrate looking for a better future. This is a regional problem, and, if 
countries continue to develop their own policies and strategies without collaborating, a 
solution is unlikely. The problem requires a regional effort with full cooperation and 
collaboration from all countries affected by the problem, including the United States. 
From the perspective of the United States, engagement with these governments is key to 
develop a regional strategy. Also, it is necessary to have the promotion of development 
programs in each country to provide alternatives for children attempting to migrate. The 
programs must be established in safe zones and with full integration of participating local 
state agencies. Finally, a program of partnering with foreign immigration law 
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enforcement agencies is necessary to manage the migration crisis from these countries. 
For all the elements to work, a coordinated effort, which prioritizes security as the 
primary step, is necessary to counter criminal groups’ turf control over the areas in which 
state agencies have not been able to establish themselves.  
In providing assistance to the region, the U.S. Congress has initiated a series of 
initiatives that resulted in the allocation of $750 million through the Central America 
Alliance for Prosperity Plan. The money has been dispensed into the following 
classifications: “$299 million for development; more than $200 million for security (via 
the Central American Regional Security Initiative); $184 million for economic programs; 
$26 million toward military activities; and $4 million to health programs, military 
training, and other programs.”66 As noticed, only $200 million has been allocated for 
security purposes. Is that enough? One of the biggest problems of these initiatives is a 
lack of accountability from the nation states and enforcing mechanisms by the United 
States to determine effectiveness.  
Although the United States provides security assistance to Central America 
through a program called Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the 
methods for evaluating its effects are very dubious. Between 2010 and 2013, U.S. 
agencies allocated over $1.2 billion in funding for CARSI and non-CARSI stated goals.67 
Also, in 2016, an additional $200 million has been appropriated for CARSI security 
goals. A specific strategy must be attached to this money to address Central American 
problems and find a solution for the security situation of the Northern Triangle countries. 
By continuing to throw money at the problem without delineated its goals, the CARSI 
program may end up being considered as another Merida Initiative, which many critics 
consider a failure. After nine years since its approval, measuring the success of the 
                                                 
66 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: United States and Central America: 
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Merida Initiative has proved a challenge. According to a CRS report, “with little publicly 
available information on what specific metrics the United States and Mexican 
governments are using to measure the impact of the Merida Initiative, analysts have 
debated how bilateral efforts should be evaluated.”68 Therefore, the United States should 
consider the effectiveness of CARSI measures before assigning and releasing funds to a 
program without a clear strategy.  
The security situation in the Northern Triangle and Mexico is not getting any 
better, even with all the initiatives and support received from the international 
community. Due to the violence levels in the region, many observers stated that, “The 
dynamics of the Merida and CARSI security initiatives have created historic levels of 
violence in the region.”69 Also, by not addressing the gang and cartels’ alliance—Maras 
and Zetas cartel— as a problem, the migration crisis may continue; it is difficult to 
believe that a kid conducts a very dangerous journey without any help. Until policy 
initiatives address the security conditions with an accountable system that ensures 
regional governments responsibilities, the violence will continue, and the children 
migration problem will also continue. At the end, it is easier to conduct the dangerous 
journey north than to stay in a place that does not provide a safe environment to prosper.  
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III. THE JOURNEY TO EL NORTE (THE NORTH) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Children fleeing to the United States have two options—utilize a smuggler or go 
it alone. Even if doing it alone, negotiations must be made along the way with turf 
owners (i.e., TCOs) to pay for passage through their territories. Some children heading 
north have no family and decide to leave by themselves. For many children, their families 
make the decision and arrangements, and still others are just forced by gangs in order to 
transport product serving as drug mules. Some children are escaping poverty or reuniting 
with family members. This group of children is migrating; however, there is another 
group that has no choice but to flee violence. Once children make the decision to conduct 
the journey north, they often embark without set plan, without knowledge or 
understanding of the journey’s dangers, traps, and ultimately, its rules. Along the way, 
children are preyed upon by cartels, police, Mexican immigration authorities, and Maras; 
they are robbed, enslaved, and raped.70 Regardless of why the children are journeying, 
there are a few critical choices that should be made: mode of transportation, the route, 
obstacles along the way, and finally, which geographical U.S.–Mexico border crossing 
point. Since this study includes a major focus on the journey between the Northern 
Triangle and the United States, the information provided in this chapter emphasizes the 
biggest obstacle—transit through Mexico.  
B. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION 
To conduct the journey, children have three options of travel: by foot, by bus, or 
by train. For many, La Bestia71 (the Beast) is really the only option for transiting through 
Mexico. Therefore, train is the most utilized mode of transport by migrants. Although 
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71 La Bestia refers to cargo trains transporting a variety of products to the United States, including 
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Mexican children do not need to worry about documents, Central Americans must have a 
visa to travel to Mexico. Mexican officials patrol the roads, bus stations, and airports but 
not the cargo train, La Bestia, which proves to be a logical route for undocumented 
migrants.72 Figure 11 shows the different available routes, transited by La Bestia, that 
start at Tapachula and Tenosique, Mexico and end south of the U.S.–Mexico border in 
three locations—Nuevo Laredo, Chihuahua, and Sonora. These three locations 
correspond to Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona on the U.S. side.  
Figure 11.  The Beast Routes from Tenosique/Tapachula to the United States 
 
Source: “Central American Migrants Face Grueling Journey North,” Dallas Morning 
News, accessed March 12, 2016, http://res.dallasnews.com/interactives/migrantroute/.  
Before getting on a train, migrants from the Northern Triangle must initiate their 
travel from their homes to the border of Mexico. Crossing the border into Mexico is 
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generally simple since it is lightly patrolled.73 Once in Mexico, transients must go by 
walking or by vehicle to the closest train terminals at Tenosique or Tapachula, Mexico. 
At the train station, the journey north begins, and there are different stopping stations 
where migrants are helped and given provisions at shelters run by civil society 
organizations.74 Upon reaching the U.S.–Mexico border, migrants must find ways to 
cross into the United States. The trains coming to the United States are subject to 
inspection and surveillance, which makes it impossible for migrants to continue their 
journey on top of the train. Once migrants disembark from the train, the next part of the 
journey comes into play: the crossing point.  
C. BORDER CROSSING POINTS 
The U.S.–Mexico border is approximately 1,933 miles in length.75 The border is 
an international boundary that runs through four United States and six Mexican states. 
From west to east, the U.S. states along the border are: California, Arizona, New Mexico, 
and Texas. The Mexican states, also west to east, are Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, 
Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Figure 12 shows the U.S.–Mexico border map. 
According to the U.S. Border Patrol data, the areas where the highest numbers of children 
were apprehended from 2010–2014 are Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas on the Mexico side 
of the border and Rio Grande and Laredo, Texas on the U.S. side.76 So, why do the 
children choose that specific border crossing point (highlighted in Figure 12)?  
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Figure 12.  U.S.–Mexico Borderlands Showing South Texas–Northern Mexico 
Study Emphasis  
 
Source: U.S. Geological Service, “U.S.–Mexico Border Environmental Health Initiative 
(Geology Component),” U.S. Geological Service, last modified March 25, 2014, 
http://gec.cr.usgs.gov/projects/borderstudies/health.html.  
D. TOPSIS DECISION 
The decision to use a specific crossing point involves numerous factors that each 
child evaluates based on her or his respective circumstances. Since the process deals with 
multi-decision making criteria, this study utilizes the technique for order preference by 
similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) method to determine the ideal geographical crossing 
point based on the criteria selected. The factors or criteria utilized for this study are 
divided into four areas: the journey, feasibility crossing, apprehension probability, and 
climate conditions. Each area contains two characteristics for consideration. See 
Appendix A for specific TOPSIS data.  
1. Journey 
Departing from one’s home country as a child and alone, must be one of the most 
difficult decisions to make. This area, the journey experience, explores two main 
characteristics: distance and the levels of violence along the route.  
a. Distance  
Although children are coming from the Northern Triangle and Mexico, this thesis 
considers distances starting from the border of Mexico and Guatemala, specifically from 
Tapachula, Mexico. The majority of the children utilize this train station as their starting 
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point because the one at Tenosique, Mexico requires longer travel through rough areas. 
As noted in Figure 13, there are three avenues of approach that children can take. The 
routes are known as the Pacific route, the Central route, and the Gulf route. Since 
children are travelling unaccompanied, distance, is the most important of the area’s 
consideration for the journey. Avoiding violence, extortion, theft, and all the challenges 
that the journey represents, children often choose to take the shortest route. Taking the 
shortest route means less difficulties and less exposure to violence.  
Figure 13.  Principal Migration Routes Through Mexico 
 
Source: “Principal Migration Routes across Mexico,” Periodico Internacional, accessed March 
2, 2016, http://www.elperiodico.com/es/graficos/internacional/migraciones-mexico-eeuu-
menores-4650/.  
b. Violence  
Violence has long existed in Mexico, mainly because of the presence of many 
cartels. Fighting for turf control is very common among cartels and other criminal 
organizations. Mexico’s southern borderlands are far more tranquil than its U.S. 
borderlands, which have experienced some of the country’s highest levels of violent 
crimes in the past decade.77 The most notorious abuses for migrants tend to happen 
further north and are related to drug trafficking, terrorism, and human trafficking.78 This 
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criterion, violence, involves data from extortion, deaths, and kidnappings committed per 
100,000 residents along the Mexico border states. Although distance was considered the 
most important characteristic of this area, violence may be highly rated based on an 
individual’s experiences. 
2. Feasibility of Going Across 
The next aspect of the journey explores the probability of crossing into the United 
States from Mexico, opportunities available to cross the border, and any obstacles that 
children may face along the way. This area examines two characteristics: land imports 
through each crossing point, and the fence built along the border.  
a. Land Imports through Crossing  
According to a study conducted by the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Mexico is the fourth largest trading partner with the United States.79 Also, the majority of 
its imports to the United States are conducted via land transport, meaning that the amount 
of trucks and heavy vehicles coming through the south border is high. More traffic means 
more opportunities to cross, either through smuggling activities or just by openly 
crossing, due to the volume of vehicles attempting to enter in comparison with personnel 
managing incoming traffic. 
b. Border Fence  
In 2006, President George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act of 2006 into 
law.80 The law’s intent was to direct the Department of Homeland Security to build 700 
miles of physical barriers along the Mexico-United States border to mitigate illegal entry 
into the United States through the southern border. As shown in Figure 14, the fence is 
not even half-way built and still allows free flow into the United States through some 
areas not secured. Children trying to cross into the United States definitely look for areas 
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where the fence has not been built, and the Rio Grande Valley-Tamaulipas/Nuevo Leon 
is one of those areas (see Figure 14).  
Figure 14.  Border Fence Construction Progress 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration in Jacques Billeaud “Fence Alone Can’t Plug Porous Border: Oft-




3. Apprehension Probability  
Upon reaching the border, it is important to know the number of agents at each 
location and the historical apprehension numbers. With this information, children can 
determine the best crossing point based on their intentions: apprehension or freedom. 
This area explores the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents by crossing sector and the 
number of apprehensions reported.  
a. Border Patrol Agents Presence  
For a rational illegal and undocumented actor, the decision to cross into the 
United States is to go where there are very few agents patrolling the area. However, 
generally, unaccompanied migrant children are not evading U.S. immigration authorities; 
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they are either being caught or deliberately turning themselves into the U.S. immigration 
agents.81 Generally, children would know the most patrolled areas based on smugglers 
information campaigns. Therefore, the number of agents at crossing points is looked at 
from what many consider an irrational point of view; however, since the children are 
looking to be apprehended, it makes complete sense to look for areas where the border 
has higher number of agents.  
b. Apprehensions  
Apprehension relates to the number of children apprehended up by U.S. Border 
Patrol agents from 2010–2014. As per Border Patrol data, the majority of the minors were 
apprehended at the Rio Grande Valley crossing zone; therefore, that sector is very 
appealing to future migrant children attempting to cross the U.S.–Mexico border because 
of their desire to be apprehended.82 
4. Climate Conditions 
Throughout the journey north, children are exposed to different climate 
conditions. Exposure to extreme weather can result in injuries and a possibility of a trip 
cancellation due to health issues. This area analyzes the climate conditions at the crossing 
points from a high/low temperature perspective.  
a. High Temperatures  
The high temperature characteristic refers to the high temperatures found in all 
border sectors. The Mexico border states contain a wide spectrum of climates, from very 
hot desert areas to very cold and humid areas. Many of the children traveling north would 
not survive the journey if they have to go across desert areas with very few supplies. The 
preference choice for this criterion would be a comfortable climate where the temperature 
is not too hot and not too cold. 
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b. Low Temperatures  
This characteristic refers to the low temperatures across all border sectors. Similar 
to the high temperatures, the low temperatures preference choice would be a comfortable 
climate where the temperature is not too cold and not too warm.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses the TOPSIS method83 to illustrate why children decide to cross 
the U.S.–Mexico border at specific crossing points, while maintaining an emphasis on 
qualitative analysis for recommended solutions. A positive or ideal solution leads 
individuals, in this case the migrant children, to select the best choice when considering 
the different criteria or attributes available. The intent is to show, if in fact, after 
considering a number of different criteria that affect migrant children’s decision to go 
across the U.S.–Mexico border, the results support what we are seeing on the ground as 
far as the increase in numbers through a specific crossing point. The TOPSIS method is 
expressed in a succession of seven steps, which follow. The 7 steps are taken directly 
from Fox’s chapter in Analyzing Risk through Probabilistic Modeling in Operations 
Research.84 
Step 1: Create an evaluation matrix consisting of m alternatives and n 
criteria, with the intersection of each alternative (A) and criterion as ijx , 
giving us a matrix ( ijx ) m x n.  
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Step 2: The D then is normalized to form the matrix R= (Rij) m x n as 









 for i =1, 2... m and j = 1, 2... n. 
Step 3: Calculate the weighted normalized decision matrix. Weights can 
come either from the decision maker or by computation. 
Step 3a: Either use the decision maker’s weights for the attributes x1, 
x2,..xn or compute the weights through the use of Saaty’s analytical 
hierarchy process (AHP)85 to obtain the weights as the eigenvector to the 





The sum of the weights’ overall attributes must equal 1 regardless of the 
method used. 
Step 3b: Multiply the weights to each of the column entries in the matrix 
from Step 2 to obtain the matrix, T.  
ܶ ൌ ሺݐ௜௝ሻ௠	୶	௡ ൌ ሺݓ௝ݎ௜௝ሻ௠	୶	௡, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉ 
Step 4: Determine the worst alternative (Aw) and the best alternative (Ab): 
Examine each attribute’s column and select the largest and smallest values 
appropriately. If the values imply larger is better (profit) then the best 
alternatives are the largest values and if the values imply smaller is better 
(such as cost) then the best alternative is the smallest value. 
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ܣ௪ ൌ ൛ൻmax	ሺݐ௜௝ห݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉|݆ ∈ ܬିൿ, ൻmin	ሺݐ௜௝ห݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉ሻ|݆ ∈ ܬାൿൟ ≡ ൛ݐ௪௝ห݆ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊ൟ, 
ܣ௪௕ ൌ ൛ൻmin	ሺݐ௜௝ห݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉|݆ ∈ ିܬ ൿ, ൻmax	ሺݐ௜௝ห݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉ሻ|݆ ∈ ܬାൿൟ ≡ ൛ݐ௕௝ห݆ ൌ 1,2, … , ݊ൟ, 
where, 
ܬା ൌ ሼ݆ ൌ 1,2, …݊|݆ሻ associated with the criteria having a positive impact, 
and 
ܬି ൌ ሼ݆ ൌ 1,2, …݊|݆ሻ  associated with the criteria having a negative 
impact. 
If possible, make all entry values in terms of positive impacts. 
Step 5: Calculate L-2. L-2 is the distance between the target alternative i 
and the worst condition Aw 
݀௜௪ ൌ ට∑ ሺݐ௜௝ െ ݐ௪௝௡௝ୀଵ ሻଶ, i=1, 2,…, m 
and the distance between the alternative i and the best condition Ab 
݀௜௕ ൌ ට∑ ሺݐ௜௝ െ ݐ௕௝௡௝ୀଵ ሻଶ, i=1, 2,…m 
where diw and  dib are the L2. Therefore, diw and  dib are the norm distances 
from the target alternative  to the worst and best conditions, respectively.  
Step 6: Calculate the similarity to the worst condition: 
ݏ௜௪ ൌ ݀௜௪ሺ݀௜௪ ൅ ݀௜௕ሻ , 0 ൑ ݏ௜௪ ൑ 1, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … ,݉ 
Siw=1 if and only if the alternative solution has the worst condition; and 
Siw=0 if and only if the alternative solution has the best condition. 
Step 7: Rank the alternatives to their value from Siw (i=1, 2,…, m). 
The two methods of normalization for dealing with criteria dimensions are 
linear normalization and vector normalization.86  
Normalization is calculated as in Step 2 of the TOPSIS process. Vector 
normalization was incorporated with the original development of the 
TOPSIS method and is calculated using the following formula: 
                                                 




For determining the weights in Step 3, it is possible that the decision maker have a 
preferred weighting scheme for the analyst to use. If not, it is prescribed utilizing Saaty’s 
nine-point pairwise strategy created for the analytical hierarchy process (AHP).87 
In Chapter IV, the results from the TOPSIS methodology are presented based on 
the criteria utilized and described above. For data information, please refer to Appendix 
A. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. STUDY DATA 
This study seeks to identify the best geographical crossing point along the U.S.–
Mexico border. Eight criteria have been established: distance, violence, land imports 
through crossing point, border fence, Border Patrol agents’ presence, number of 
apprehensions, high temperatures, and low temperatures—as Table 2 shows. Then, the 
researcher employed the TOPSIS method, following the seven steps outlined. Table 3 
shows the weighted normalized decision matrix.  
Table 2.   Collected Data from Crossing Points 
 
Table 3.   Criteria Weighting 
 
 
The positive ideal (Ab) and negative ideal (Aw) solutions were collected using equations 
from Step 4 and presented in Table 4.  
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Table 4.   Positive and Negative Ideal Solutions 
 
The ranking of the alternatives derived from the equation on Step 7 and presented 
in Table 5. The fifth alternative (Nuevo Leon) is considered the best geographical 
crossing point for children to take in order to be successful at crossing the U.S.–Mexico 
border and completing the journey north prior to being apprehended.  
Table 5.   Closeness Coefficient and Rank 
 
 
B. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This study has found that children select the shortest route as their primary 
concern. Because of the danger encountered along the routes, hardly any child migrants 
from the Northern Triangle or Mexico follow the central or Pacific routes. Distance is 
always a critical factor for child migrants when selecting routes.88 When selecting a 
specific geographical location to cross the U.S.–Mexico border, children must be aware 
of all the risks associated with the decision; however, they are often not aware of all the 
risks. A minimal mistake can and sometimes does end up in death. As Oscar Martinez 
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notes, “The difference between knowing and not knowing is patience and hard work.”89 
Unfortunately, in the case of migrating children, they do not have the time to delay their 
decisions until they know everything they need to know.  
As the children’s motivation to conduct the journey north is influenced by the 
notion of better opportunities and the possibility of staying in the United States, then, the 
ranking results provided by TOPSIS methodology found that the fifth alternative 
(crossing at, Nuevo Leon) provides the best reward for the individual. Even when 
manipulating the weighting criteria to identify possible differences of importance by 
individuals, the results did not change; Nuevo Leon crossing is still the best choice. 
Options number 1 (Nuevo Leon), and option number 2 (Tamaulipas) are the best options, 
according to the criteria selected, for children who decide to cross to the United States. 
Based on the number of children apprehended at the Rio Grande Valley, this study 
supports that location as the best crossing point. The results strongly support the data 
provided by the U.S. Border Patrol, which identifies the Rio Grande Valley, Texas (U.S. 
side of the border) and Tamaulipas/Nuevo Leon (Mexico side) as the highest 
geographical crossing point for unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle and 
Mexico. A comprehensive approach and strategy must be redacted to stop the flow of 
children through these geographical crossing points. Also, “La Bestia” is a critical 
method of transportation that needs to be addressed. The inaction of the Mexican 
government in searching and patrolling the train and its routes promotes a viable option 
of travel through Mexico.  
Although there are many explanations as to why that specific crossing point is 
chosen, the TOPSIS methodology confirms that no matter the criteria utilized to 
determine the best crossing sector, the majority of the time, children select the same 
crossing point. In dealing with this problem, the response from the United States has been 
to increase the number of border patrol agents; however, that action shows that the more 
agents, the more children are apprehended. Therefore, what the United States is doing is 
not lowering the number of children coming across, and a more comprehensive strategy 
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must be implemented in order to provide results that show a decrease in unaccompanied 
children coming across the Nuevo Laredo/Rio Grande crossing points. 
This first part of the thesis presented the problem and the journey that children 
endured in trying to look for better economic opportunities and avoid violence. 
Children’s migration is a result of fragile and corrupt state institutions that lack the ability 
to address causes of violence and provide security for their citizens. The states’ inaction 
leaves a vacuum that is filled by powerful criminal organizations that rule to their own 
benefit. At a Western Hemisphere forum hosted by the National Defense University, 
Doug Farah stated, “There is a need for socializing rather than criminalizing approaches 
in the Northern Triangle. Gangs and criminal organizations are a reaction to social factors 
like exclusion. Gangs and many of these groups must be factored in discussions of 
national security.”90 Now that the children have reached the border, let’s look at what the 
United States is doing to address the problem.  
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V. APPREHENSION PROCESS 
Prior to 2002, the responsibility of apprehension and treatment of unaccompanied 
children fell under the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) jurisdiction. The 
main policy of the INS was detention, while releasing a child to a responsible adult was 
the exception. The INS policy toward children apprehended limited release of a child to a 
“parent or legal guardian” except in “unusual circumstances.”91 This policy granted 
immediate detention, limited process of registry, and eventual deportation to immigration 
agencies of children’s home countries. As a result of this policy, the agency received a lot 
of criticism for its treatment of apprehended children. After a series of lawsuits 
challenging INS treatment of children—in particular, the routine strip and body 
searches,92 the lack of a probable cause hearing on deportability, the lack of a proper 
custody hearing on releasing minors to third party adults, and the absence of an 
independent review of the detention policy for the sole purpose of ensuring appearance in 
court proceeding93—advocates’ allegations resulted in great scrutiny from lawmakers. 
In 1997, the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA) was the consequence of over 10 
years of suit with respect to the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s detainment 
approach for unaccompanied children.94 The agreement required all INS detention 
facilities to provide education, visitation, recreation, and the segregation of detained 
minors from unrelated adults.95 In response to the INS allegations, Judge Thomas Tang 
wrote, “Liberty is the norm: detention and restraint by the state is the exception. To 
operate otherwise makes a mockery of government of the people and by the people…and 
                                                 
91 Joseph M. Makalusky, “Reno v. Flores: A Violation of International Law?” New England Law 
Boston 2, no. 1 (19096), http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/nejicl/vol2/reno.htm#N_1_.  
92 Lutheran Immigration and Refuge Service, “Flores Settlement Agreement & DHS Custody” 
(Baltimore, MD: Lutheran Immigration and Refuge Service, 2014), http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/12/Flores-Family-Detention-Backgrounder-LIRS-WRC-KIND-FINAL1.pdf.  
93 Ibid.  
94 Ibid.  
95 “Case 2:85-cv-04544-RJK,” Clearinghouse, January 26, 2004, http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/IM-CA-0002-0003.pdf.  
48 
ignores the very substance of the Bill of Rights.”96 The comments made by Judge Tang 
were an open statement highlighting the INS wrongdoings involving children. Even 
though the INS was directed by law to follow the agreement, complaints by advocate 
groups did not stop. In 2001, four years after the agreement was completed, the Office of 
the Inspector General published a report demonstrating violations of the FSA committed 
by the INS.97 Urged by advocacy groups and the public to respond aggressively, the U.S. 
Congress decided to act. 
In 2002, the U.S. Congress dismantled the Immigration and Naturalization 
Services (INS) and transferred enforcement functions to Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Both of these entities were 
consolidated by the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 under one federal 
agency, the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With the closure of 
INS, the obligation regarding the consideration, authority, and situation of 
unaccompanied children were sent to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS), particularly its subordinate agency the Office of Refugee Resettlement 
(ORR).98 Upon classification of children (age, country of origin, who will stay, and who 
will be deported), the Department of Justice (DOJ) assumes jurisdiction on adjudicating 
immigration cases, including removal proceedings.99 These three departments (DHS, 
DHHS, and DOJ) are the U.S. agencies responsible for the unaccompanied children’s 
journey throughout the immigration process. Within each agency, there are specific 
departments in charge for the care, guardianship, and placement of unaccompanied 
children. Figure 15 shows the hierarchy of the three agencies responsible for the process. 
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Figure 15.  Agencies that Interact with Unaccompanied Children 
 
 
A. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
The biggest law enforcement organization of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security is U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and it is  charged with controlling 
and facilitating international exchange, gathering import obligations, and implementing 
controls regarding trade, customs, and immigration.100 CBP’s primary responsibility is to 
protect the borders and ports of entry of the United States. This responsibility is divided 
between two subordinate agencies: the Office of Border Patrol (OBP), and the Office of 
Field Operations (OFO). The OBP protects the United States’ borders by preventing 
undocumented persons, smugglers, and any contraband from entering the United States, 
while the OFO processes the persons, goods, and conveyances entering and leaving the 
nation.101 A coordinated effort between these two agencies is necessary to maximize the 
effectiveness of law enforcement practices in the U.S. border areas.  
B. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
The primary mission of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is “to 
promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement 
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of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.”102 ICE was 
established in 2003 as the biggest investigative organization of the DHS responsible of 
administering the country’s immigration system.103 The agency’s largest single area of 
responsibility is immigration enforcement. The focus of ICE’s enforcement infrastructure 
is within the U.S. interior to remove deportable illegal adults and/or minors. In this case, 
ICE agents are responsible for the apprehension of children inside the United States, 
transportation to shelters, and any other support that requires transfer procedures inside 
the homeland.  
How does a DHS agent process an individual once they are apprehended? When 
an individual appears to be a minor, the initial step is to determine if he/she is less than 
18 years old. If DHS agents determine that the individual apprehended is 18 years old or 
younger, then the institution has three to five days to transfer the child to the ORR.104 
Once under ORR custody, the child’s situation must be assessed to determine which form 
of legal relief can be granted. If determined that the individual is not classified as 18 
years old or younger, the deportation process begins.  
C. OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT  
The Office of Refugee Resettlement is responsible of providing new populaces 
the chance to amplify their potential in the United States.105 Among the new populations 
targeted by the ORR are those in the Unaccompanied Children Program. To support this 
new population, the ORR created a program under the Division of Unaccompanied 
Children Services (DUCS) Office. The program accommodates for the guardianship and 
care of unaccompanied minors who have been captured by ICE, CBP, or any other 
federal agency. Following the establishment of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008, the ORR was required to develop a plan ensuring 
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legal counseling for all children, oversee the infrastructure and personnel of UAC 
residential facilities, and most importantly, screen each child to identify victims of 
trafficking in persons.106 The screening provides a base of legality for the processes that 
each child could possibly apply for in obtaining a form of relief to stay in the United 
States. 
D. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW 
The Executive Office for Immigration Review’s essential mission is “to 
adjudicate immigration cases in a careful and timely manner, including cases involving 
detained aliens, criminal aliens, and aliens seeking asylum as a form of relief, while 
ensuring the standards of due process and fair treatment for all parties involved.”107 
Although productivity and timeliness adjudicating immigration cases is part of the 
office’s goals, the number of children requiring services is overwhelming. An immigrant 
children’s advocate from Chicago states, “Children are required to find their own 
lawyers, appear in court, with or without an attorney, and navigate the complex U.S. 
immigration system alone.”108 Not having an attorney available to represent each child 
complicates the process of properly identifying causality for a humanitarian form of relief 
to avoid immediate deportation/removal. 
E. LEGAL FORMS OF RELIEF 
The types of help accessible to unaccompanied children include: asylum, 
withholding from removal and protection below the United Nations Convention against 
Torture (CAT), Special Juvenile Immigrant Status (SIJS), a T-visa, and/or a U-visa.109  
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1. Asylum  
Although asylum is a form of relief available to unaccompanied children, this 
relief presents many problems when applying it to a child. The law is designed to be 
applicable to adults, considering a child as a property of a sponsor figure over 18 years 
old. In the absence of a sponsor, many cases of asylum requested for unaccompanied 
children have been dismissed due to non-applicability. In order to be applicable to a 
child, he/she must fall within the definition of a refugee written under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA):  
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.110  
The fact that these children are often unable to explain their motivations as fear of 
persecution makes it very difficult for lawyers to request asylum.  
2. Convention against Torture  
The Convention against Torture (CAT) protection is granted for individuals who 
have encountered or fear torture by their governments or by any non-state actor within 
their home countries’ boundaries.111 To be eligible for this form of protection, the child 
must articulate their experiences in front of a special judge, an experience that, for most 
children, is very intimidating. 
3. SIJS Status 
SIJS status “is granted for children who have been victims of abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect.”112 This type of status is for someone considered a “street 
child,” who has no one to be responsible for her or his care. Once SIJS is granted, it 
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allows certain undocumented and unaccompanied children to acquire legal and 
permanent residency in the United States.113  
4. T-Visa 
In 2000, the U.S. Congress approved the Victims of Trafficking Protection Act 
intended to indict traffickers and ensure protection to victims.114 A T-visa is “offered to 
children who have been victims of trafficking.”115 
5. U-Visa 
A U-visa is offered to children who have been victims of all other criminal acts 
and will cooperate with law enforcement agents in criminal investigations.116 In granting 
any of these types of help for unaccompanied children, legal access or representation 
must be available. With the recent increase of unaccompanied and undocumented 
children, the American Bar Association has acknowledged that the lack of representation 
for these children hinders the ability for a fair case because of the children’s inability to 
effectively represent themselves in court.117 Accessibility to legal representation must be 
available in order to provide the necessary tools for a fair and balance process. While 
children are waiting for legal processes, the goal of the ORR is to release them to a 
sponsor. One of ORR’s foremost obligations is to enforce the Flores settlement act rules 
that mandates timely release of children to an endorsed sponsor that guarantees the kid’s 
appearance in court as necessary.118  
6. ORR Options 
The following options are assessed during the ORR screening process. 
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a. Family Reunification 
The established preference for release under the family reunification program 
follows this order: parents, adult relatives, parent’s representatives, and ORR assigned 
representative.  
b. Foster Care 
The foster care program has four different choices (short-term, long-term, 
extended group care, and therapeutic) available for children based on their needs. Short-
term care is one of the options offered to children who need a sponsor for just a short 
period until the legal case is reviewed and adjudicated. This category is mainly filled by 
children between eight and 13 years old who have relatives (extended family) living 
already in the United States and able to care for them. The next option is long-term care. 
Long-term care is offered to children whose case is still unknown, mainly those for 
whom more information is needed in order to make a determination about the possibility 
of them remaining in the United States. The next option is the extended group care, 
which is offered to children who must remain with foster care support after their 
eighteenth birthday. The program provides support for children from 18–21 years old, 
allowing them to continue to go school, adapt, and find a job to sustain themselves. The 
last option is therapeutic care; this type of care is provided to children who needs more 
personalized attention based on age, psychological profile, and mental aptitude. 
Assignment and placement is determined by the agency’s screening process. 
c. Voluntary Departure 
Unaccompanied children who go back to their countries can do so voluntarily. 
Most kids qualified for “voluntary departure under the TVPRA and need not pay for 
transportation to their home countries.”119 This practice has been highly criticized by 
anti-immigration advocates because many criminals (child with criminal records) take 
advantage of the law and get a free ticket home paid for by U.S. taxpayers.  
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Figure 16 shows the apprehension process. Initially, children could be 
apprehended by either ICE or CBP agents, depending on their location. If children are 
trying to enter the United States via the U.S.–Mexico border, CBP agents are responsible 
for the children’s apprehension; however, if children are apprehended inside the United 
States, ICE agents are responsible. Once the child is apprehended, CBP or ICE agents 
conduct the initial screening, mainly through interviews. If a child is determined to be 
less than 18 years old, the screening process turns into a time pressure event because 
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, unaccompanied 
children must be transferred to the Division of Child Services in the ORR within three to 
five days after apprehension. When children arrived in ORR custody, screening processes 
begin to determine each child status and options available to remain in the United States. 
The process is applied to all children deemed unaccompanied and under 18 years of age. 
One exception is made to unaccompanied children from contiguous countries (in our 
case: Mexico). Under the current law (TVPRA), “children from contiguous countries are 
screened within 48 hours of being apprehended to determine whether they should be 
returned to their county or transferred to HHS and placed in removal proceedings” (see 
Figure 16).120 
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Figure 16.  Apprehension Process 
 
 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The majority of these agencies dealing with the children’s immigration/
deportation processes were created as a result of the Flores Settlement Act of 1997 in 
response to the accusations of INS rights violations. Even after 18 years of the agreement, 
some of its major provisions have not been fully implemented. Even though the care of 
children must be the top priority of these agencies, there have been serious allegations 
about the ORR mistreatment of children under its custody. The Office of Refugee 
Resettlement depends on state childcare personnel and local police to identify and report 
mistreatment of children in its care, rather than reporting to the Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation (FBI) any genuine accusations. When local authorities are responsible for 
their own investigations, criminal cases associated with children have disintegrated as a 
result of incompetent investigator work, communication gaps with government 
authorities, and jurisdictional disarray.121 No ORR representative has ever been arraigned 
under a 2008 federal provision, which specifically highlight inappropriate contact with a 
detainee in ORR’s facilities a lawful offense.122 Allegations such as this one makes the 
program untrustworthy in the eyes of the U.S. taxpayers and makes public opinion an 
obstacle for lawmakers to fund the program and increase support for it.  
The apprehension process must be a seamless procedure in which all agencies 
involved cooperate and communicate effectively to properly enforce the law. In 1996, 
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) to encourage cooperation and collaboration among law enforcement agencies. 
However, after 9/11, the priority of law enforcement agencies has been in identifying 
undocumented immigrants who are deemed criminal or terrorist threats, and non-
threatening individuals are not considered a priority. Since children are not considered a 
priority unless they have a criminal record, ICE will not support state law enforcement 
agent’s prosecution of undocumented aliens. These events have led to a lack of trust 
between state and federal immigration law enforcement agencies.  
The problem lies in the fact that ICE does not have a reliable system of 
identifying who is a threat to the United States. For many state law enforcement agents, 
ICE is simply deporting anybody whom it views as suspicious. The Immigration and 
Policy Center report states, “Not only is ICE deporting people who aren’t a threat, but it’s 
deporting many of them in ways that don’t respect the full range of legal rights which 
form the basis of the U.S. criminal justice system.”123 This statement clearly illustrates 
the lack of cooperation and collaboration between the agencies responsible for enforcing 
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immigration policies and state law enforcement agents, which creates a great deal of 
concern for policymakers. Among the worries referred to by policymakers are the burden 
on restricted resources, the undermining of the overall population well-being, the 
obliteration of families, and the flawed defendability of ICE personnel.124  
Each federal agency has its own set of priorities, which many times do not 
correlate to the priorities of states/nations. If we want to achieve success regarding 
immigration, all U.S. agencies must commit to the same priorities by enforcing the law 
through coordination and collaboration, not only within the United States, but also with 
foreign law enforcement agencies from neighboring countries. Upon apprehension, 
children are shuttled between DHS, DHHS, and DOJ, which requires the judgement of 
many personnel from immigration enforcement, citizenship services, state and federal 
courts, police, non-governmental organizations, and others. A system of integration must 
ensue in order to achieve due process to amplify children’s well-being and to mitigate 
punitive effects. The process is achievable through coordination and collaboration inside 
custodial facilities. Can a comprehensive approach be achieved within the construct of 
our immigration agencies? It is possible, but a mandate must come from congressional 
law.  
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VI. DETENTION AND CURRENT POLICY 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
The issues of detention and current policy are interconnected. Detention norms 
and regulations are driven by policy. Prior to releasing authority for the care and custody 
of unaccompanied children, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) focused its 
efforts in detaining all children violating immigration laws and making the release of 
children to responsible sponsors an exception.125 This effort culminated with the U.S. 
government dismantling of the INS and transferring authority to the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS). As mentioned in Chapter V, due to all the reported 
abuses committed by the INS against children in custody, the U.S. Congress was forced 
to create policy in order to address the problem. The mandate created the Office of 
Refugee and Resettlement (ORRs) under the DHHS, which child services office took 
responsibility for the care and treatment of unaccompanied children (UAC). 
The philosophy was to place UAC within “a non-institutional, home-like 
atmosphere of care in the least restrictive setting” and for services be administered in a 
child-friendly environment.126 Although ORR policy established the least restrictive 
setting for the placement of children, it did not have the resources necessary to 
accommodate policy and was forced to continue with detention practices placing the 
children in different categories based on initial screening information. According to 
critics of detention practices in the United States, detention must not be the solution to 
accommodate children’s necessities. The Flores v. Meese case established that  
Policies constructed to deal with the confinement of children at both the 
state and federal levels have recognized the practical need to avoid 
institutional detention where less restrictive means are available. It is the 
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states, rather than the federal government, which are primarily responsible 
for child welfare issues.127  
This case created separation between state and federal law enforcement agents because it 
required a state heavy involvement in what states considered a federal problem. 
Therefore, policies must be reviewed to understand detention practices and the current 
policy that affects the unaccompanied children population coming from Mexico and the 
Northern Triangle.  
B. DETENTION 
Are children from Mexico and the Northern Triangle traveling thousands of miles 
only to end up in detention? The simple answer to this question is: no. Children undertake 
the journey in order to escape violence; therefore, as a result, a peaceful environment will 
provide better opportunities. In the documentary Living on One Dollar, the producer 
Zach Ingrasci shows the difficult daily lives of the people in rural Guatemala. He 
experiences “hunger, parasites, and extreme financial stress as he attempts to survive life 
on the edge”—as a Guatemalan would.128 During his journey, Ingrasci bonds with local 
families and was able to understand the difficulties that the local families have in trying 
to make it through each day. The families in the communities had to choose between 
sending their children to school and making them work in order to survive. This situation 
is common throughout rural communities in Mexico and the Northern Triangle, and is 
one reason children decide to leave and look for better opportunities. If children know 
that they will be apprehended and kept in detention facilities, they will be less likely to 
conduct the journey, since being detained does not provide opportunities to find a job.  
While conducting an interview with an undocumented child in U.S. custody, 
Susan J. Terrio found youths were advised by smugglers to lie about their age and 
nationality because the United States detains underage migrants in jail for years, does not 
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allow them to work, and never gives them legal status.129 Smugglers adjust their 
information campaign based on the behavior of the U.S. authorities. Since 2011, the 
increase of undocumented children apprehended at the border has overwhelmed the 
system. Even today, the custodial system is plagued with problems. The massive 
bureaucratization of custody has produced systemic deficits, including lack of 
coordination in data collection and tracking, loss or inappropriate sharing of confidential 
information, unnecessary delays, and others problems.130  
Once a child is apprehended, screened by ICE or CBP agents, and transferred to 
ORR facilities, the ORR agents, known as the intake team, conduct an additional 
screening to determine the level of risk that a child poses to himself/herself and to others. 
Based on the result of this latest screening, children are placed into a tiered system of 
detention facilities organized by three security levels—low, medium, and high. 
Figure 17 shows the key shelters locations throughout the United States. It is 
important to highlight the point that after the intake team determines each child 
placement, availability of space from these shelters is required. Once shelter availability 
is found, ICE personnel transfer the child to the available shelter space, and in many 
instances, shelters are far away from the location where children were apprehended. 
Upon the child’s arrival at the shelter, the process for determining available relief to stay 
in the United States or deportation proceedings begins. The entire process lasts anywhere 
from 30 days to a year and a half.131 The process delays the children prospects for work 
to help their families back home. Is the United States doing the right thing according to 
the law and current policy?  
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Figure 17.  Shelter Locations in The United States 
 
Source: “One Media Outlet Catching On To Massive Governmental Non-Profits Housing 
The Unaccompanied Alien Minors—‘Southwest Key’ Under Review,” posted July 22, 
2014 by Sundance, The Last Refuge, http://theconservativetreehouse.com/2014/07/22/ 
one-media-outlet-catching-on-to-massive-governmental-non-profits-housing-the-
unaccompanied-alien-minors-southwest-key-under-review/.  
C. CURRENT POLICY  
While violence and poverty are compelling cases for explanations in the rise of 
undocumented children since 2011, the U.S. policy toward child immigration bears a 
great deal of responsibility. Existing laws, provide incentives for children trying to leave 
their home countries instead of working as a deterrent mechanism. Pursuing better system 
procedures and treatment of unaccompanied children, the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008 has created unintended consequences. Under this 
law, unaccompanied children from Central American countries (e.g., the Northern 
Triangle) are placed under judicial proceedings through which an immigration judge 
determines their eligibility for relief or deportation. For Mexican children, the assessment 
for deportation is immediate (within 48 hours). Thus, the TVPRA has established a two-
track system. Unaccompanied Mexican children are usually subject to fast extradition and 
those from Central America who stay in the United States pending immigration court 
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hearings that could be months or more away.132 With new policy, smugglers immediately 
adapt to a narrative advertising their services. Also, this action of policy explains or is 
likely one of the reasons for the sharp increase in Central American minors over any 
other demographic of unaccompanied children. The next sections discuss how the United 
States got to the approval of the TVPRA of 2008.  
1. Flores Settlement Act of 1997  
The problems that led to the Flores and Settlement Act (FSA) of 1997 began in 
1985 when two human rights organizations filed a lawsuit against the INS process for 
detainment, care, and discharge of unaccompanied children in detention.133 After many 
years of litigation between human rights organizations that joined the movement and the 
INS, a settlement was reached. The settlement required the INS to abide by three 
categories. First, it was required to release children without any delay in the process; 
secondly, it had to assign the children to the least restrictive setting; and third, it had to 
execute measures for suitable consideration and treatment of children in detainment.134 
Among the third category was the requirement to provide education, visitation, 
recreation, and the segregation of detained minors from unrelated adults.135 Even though 
the INS agreed upon all the requirements, the agency failed to deliver and more negative 
allegations surfaced. In 2001, many years after the initial lawsuit, an inspector general 
investigation reported many violations committed by the INS that encouraged Congress 
to enact the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
2. Homeland Security Act of 2002 
A major result of the Homeland Security Act (HSA) was to divide the obligations 
regarding the handling and treatment of unaccompanied children between the Department 
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of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS). The HSA act determined that DHS was responsible for the apprehension, 
transfer, and repatriation procedures of children, and that the DHHS was responsible for 
coordinating, implementing care and placement, reunifying child with a sponsor, 
maintaining a list of legal services, and collecting statistical information for all 
children.136 After the implementation of the HSA of 2002, many critics kept advocating 
for reform with allegations that the Flores Settlement Act had not been fully implemented 
and that there were still many violations of children’s rights committed by these newly 
created agencies.137 Based on these allegations, Congress passed the TVPRA of 2008. 
This law quickly generated complaints by advocate groups. Its intent was to protect 
unaccompanied children from Mexico and the Northern Triangle; however, it created a 
bias road where the law seems to benefit only some children—based on their country of 
origin.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The issue of detention and policy has been revised by Congress since the 1980s. 
The initial reform was enacted under the Flores Settlement Act of 1997 after many years 
of litigation. Then came the enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which 
divided the responsibilities for processing and treatment of unaccompanied children. 
Finally, the TVPRA of 2008 was enacted, which created a distinction between children 
from Central America and Mexico. Although efforts have been made in trying to alleviate 
the procedures and systems of an overwhelming problem facing the U.S. immigration 
agencies, advocates, and critics continue to look for reforms. As noted before, detention 
practices are only changed through the passage of policy, if not, the “status quo” remains. 
Finally, there are three aspects of reform that must occur to deal with the detention 
problem of unaccompanied children coming to the United States. First, there must be 
policy reform to either apply the same rules to all children or find a different approach. 
Secondly, the United States obviously is losing the information campaign to smugglers; 
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therefore, once a policy reform is enacted, the United States must push an information 
operations campaign that prevents unintended consequences, such as countering the 
smuggler’s information push to bring migrants to United States under deception 
practices. Third, the United States should analyze if the continuation of detention 
practices of unsustainable numbers of UAC who will be released to families or a sponsor 
makes sense.138 Why spend all the money in providing good care, education, legal advice, 
and other amenities? The United States is a nation of law-abiding citizens, and it is 
mandatory that everybody coming to the United States understand that. If not, chaos will 
ensue, and we will continue to see massive immigration of undocumented children 
looking for better opportunities.  
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. SUMMARY 
Violence levels in Mexico and in the Northern Triangle—Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador—have transformed the region into one of the most dangerous locations 
in the world. The reality of crime, violence, and lack of public and personal security in 
the Northern Triangle is horrible for much of the population, and it is not improving. 
These two factors—violence and security—are the push factors influencing children’s 
decision to leave their homeland. Although children’s migration literature often mentions 
poverty as one of the main drivers of migration, it does not provide details as to what are 
the causes of poverty. Furthermore, migration is exacerbated in the Central American 
countries in which violence levels are increasingly high when compared to other 
countries in the region. Although poverty can drive migration in some cases, it is not a 
priority for children deciding to leave their home countries. This is supported by the fact 
that Nicaragua is the poorest country in the isthmus (Central America), it has a very low 
presence of youth gangs, and the level of violence regarding homicide data is relatively 
low. Therefore, by examining the Nicaraguan’s government policies regarding violence, 
other countries in the region may possibly encounter solutions to their own problems. 
Poverty is a result of the Northern Triangle governments’ inability to establish (security, 
development) institutions. Therefore, children in the Northern Triangle have three 
options: 1) stay in their home countries and become part of transnational criminal 
organizations; 2) migrate to the United States looking for better opportunities; or 3) die. 
Beginning in 2011, many children from the Northern Triangle and Mexico decided to 
take option two, making the dangerous journey to the United States over the other two 
options available.  
Many children are leaving their homes, often very violent places, to conduct a 
very long and dangerous journey; therefore, distance plays a big role when selecting 
where to cross along the U.S.–Mexico border. Why? Along the route, there are many 
crimes that go unreported—extortion, rape, kidnapping, robbery and others, and the 
shorter the route, the less exposure children will have to these crimes. Also, in 2010, 
68 
when the Zetas cartel decided to break away from the Gulf cartel and look for other 
sources of revenue, smuggling children to the United States was a very lucrative option. 
In Chapter II, the relationship established between the Zetas cartel from Mexico and the 
MS-13 gang in the Northern Triangle resulted in the route pattern that children follow, 
specifically through the Zetas territory in Mexico. The only way to travel is in large 
groups (unaccompanied alien children travel in large groups on top of the train) through 
Mexican cartels’ territory. Arranging transit is a role that MS-13 gang members 
(smugglers) and the Zetas fill to benefit from this operation. Although very difficult to 
prove, the dates of events match the situation encountered on the ground by U.S. Border 
Patrol. These events are: beginning in 2006, the levels of violence in Central America 
began increasingly greatly; in 2008, the U.S. president signed into law the TVPRA 
policy; in 2009, unaccompanied children apprehension data began to be recorded; in 
2010, the Zetas break away from the Gulf cartel and made a pact with the Mara 
Salvatrucha; and finally, from 2011 until recently, a massive increase of unaccompanied 
children being apprehended at the U.S.–Mexico border have flooded the U.S. 
immigration system.  
Currently, the U.S. Border Patrol sector of the Rio Grande Valley is processing 
more than 50,000 kids this year alone, and it seems that the numbers will continue to 
grow unless a strong action is taken by the United States and international partners to 
solve the problem and serve as a deterrent, which goes beyond U.S. economics to a 
regional humanitarian crisis. While steps could be taken to curb the number of children 
coming into the United States, it merely condemns those who cannot come to a life of 
victimization and possibly death at the hands of those while trying to escape. The 
solution to the problem rests in solving the underlying causes that led to the violence in 
the first place; however, that is beyond the scope of this paper and a topic to be explored 
in future research.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Unaccompanied children migration from the Northern Triangle and Mexico is a 
very complex problem with no easy solution. To begin addressing the crisis, there must be 
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political will and a strong message from the United States directed at the countries 
involved, and any actors supporting illegal immigration. The solution must be a multi-
prong effort that covers policy reform, coordination among law enforcement agencies, 
border enforcement, a robust information operations (IO) campaign countering smuggling 
activity, and finally targeting Mexican cartels and gangs (similar tactics used during the 
strategy that former President Fox implemented) , specifically MS-13, calling all violent 
groups TCOs is not providing the results needed to affect these groups illicit activities.  
1. Policy Reform 
In 2008, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act was enacted in 
order to ease what was considered a humanitarian crisis. Under the current policy, 
immediate repatriation of children only applies to contiguous countries—Mexico and 
Canada. This statute is only enforced by the fact that the secretary of state is able to 
negotiate only with contiguous countries and not with countries from the Northern 
Triangle.139 Therefore, a reform to this policy must be the first step in looking for 
solutions. The secretary of state should not have any limitation in dealing with the 
countries involved, in this case the Northern Triangle, to apply the same treatment to all 
countries. The reform also must address the backlog in the Justice Department system for 
children waiting to be seen by an immigration judge. This backlog causes kids to stay in 
the United States an average of 90 days before the cases are evaluated by immigration 
judges. During that time, the United States must feed, educate, provide medical services, 
and legal counsel to all minors in custody. The long waits create an impression that once 
in the United States, children will be granted some form of relief. This information is 
exploited by smugglers who benefit from the business of migration. Since we are on an 
election year and Congress is looking to end what is known as a humanitarian crisis, 
“ending a humanitarian crisis rooted in gang violence, human trafficking, and weakened 
economies in multiple Central American countries will not be easy, but dealing with 
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unaccompanied minors in a humane way should be our primary goal.”140 Therefore, 
political will to resolve the problem must exist if a solution to children migration is 
desirable.  
So why is there no movement toward solving the problem? In Adios, America, 
Ann Coulter makes the argument that the United States has been manipulated by a 1 
percent minority (the very wealthy). She argues: 
Everyone who supports our current immigration policies does so for his or 
her own reason: Democrats for the votes; employers for the cheap labor; 
the wealthy people for the nannies, maids, and gardeners; Republicans for 
the campaign cash; and churches for the taxpayer money.141  
This year, 2016, is an election year, and immigration is at the forefront of the political 
campaigns; however, only time would tell if the U.S. politicians are really serious about 
solving the problem or maintaining the status quo. 
2. Minimize the Number of U.S. Border Patrol Sectors and Create Joint
Organizations
Currently, the U.S.–Mexico border is divided into nine sectors (see Appendix A, 
item 2: U.S. Border Patrol sectors map); however, within each sector, state and federal law 
enforcement agencies—the Department of Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the FBI, the Department of Justice, state and local police, military elements, 
and others—do not operate jointly. In the case of child migration, the Department of Health 
and Human Services also plays a role in making sure that the children are placed into 
appropriate shelters upon apprehension. Each organization is responsible for a piece of the 
puzzle in solving the problem; however, due to funding and relevance competition, 
working together undermines each organization’s existence. As Clifford Gyves states, 
140 Philip E. Wolgin and Angela Maria Kelley, “5 Things You Need to Know About Unaccompanied 
Children,” Center for American Progress, June 18, 2014, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
immigration/news/2014/06/18/92056.  
141 In 2012, Lutheran Family Services Rocky Mountains’ gross revenue was $12,915,054; 
$10,812,318 came from government contracts. Ann Corcoran, “Lutheran Family Services Rocky 
Mountains Largely Funded by Government Contracts,” Refugee Resettlement Watch, October 29, 2014, 
https://refugeeresettlementwatch.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/lutheran-family-services-rocky-mountains-
largely-funded-by-government-contracts/; Ann Coulter, Adios, America! The Left’s Plan to Turn Our 
Country into a Third World Hellhole (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2015), 25.  
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“each organization may hold a piece of the overall information puzzle but is restricted from 
having the whole picture (therefore limiting its perceived power, since knowledge 
is power).”142 To avoid competition, institutional reform to create joint organizations 
is needed. As Figure 18 shows, on the U.S. side of the border, we have four states 
bordering with Mexico. To simplify the current nine-sector border, each state should 
have a joint organization composed of all the agencies that operate independently, 
including local and state law enforcement agencies. These joint organizations would 
share all information and operational activities working together toward creating a 
common operating picture of the problem. Instead of having to coordinate with many 
different agencies about processing children apprehended at the border, each joint 
organization would have the personnel in-house required to address the problem 
immediately. With this approach, many bureaucracies would turn into one, and the 
different agencies would not have to fight for relevance; rather, each would be part of 
the greater grand strategy organization or the “whole of government” approach. The 
final intent is to make “public, private, national, regional, and local actors work 
together, but in order to do so, they must operate from an integrated strategy founded on 
a common base of information.”143 This concept not only might work for solving 
migration problems, but it would solve many problems related to national and homeland 
security efforts.  
142 Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, Maras, 193.  
143 Ibid., 192.  
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Figure 18.  U.S.–Mexico Borderlands Showing South Texas–Northern Mexico 
Study Emphasis 
Source: U.S. Geological Service, “U.S.–Mexico Border Environmental Health Initiative 
(Geology Component),” U.S. Geological Service, last modified March 25, 2014, 
http://gec.cr.usgs.gov/projects/borderstudies/health.html.  
3. Creation of Social Programs and Safe Zones
The creation of social programs and the establishment of safe zones in the region 
require leadership from the affected countries (i.e., the Northern Triangle and Mexico) to 
establish the political will to implement changes. The inability of the region’s 
governments to establish a foothold in smuggling routes through their territories allows 
TCOs to maintain control and gives them freedom of movement to conduct illegal 
activities. In these ungoverned areas, TCOs do not allow institutions to establish 
themselves and start providing basic services to the population. Subsequently, making 
sensible options for migration so children have realistic opportunities at home should be 
the focus of any support provided by the United States.144 Instead of placing children in 
shelters in the United States, a system of shelters should be established in different 
regions of each country that allow the children to stay in their home countries. These 
shelters should provide alternatives to migration that the children are looking for and also 
provide a safe environment in which children can do day-to-day activities without fear of 
being killed. To establish the shelters and safe zones, the United States must support the 
region financially and provide expertise related to the establishment of the shelters. The 
144 Rosenblum, Unaccompanied Child Migration, 20.  
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Obama administration requested $1 billion in FY2015 to support development efforts in 
Central America; however, only $300 million are appropriated for security.145 All funds 
directed to support Central America should have a specific activity attached to its funding 
instead of providing a blank check, which as is well known, usually ends up in the wrong 
hands or is directed toward ineffective solutions.  
4. Information Operations Campaign
Combatting child migration also requires cooperation from media outlets. Every 
time that the United States creates a new immigration law, an information campaign must 
be conducted to deter unauthorized flows of immigrants. To this day, smugglers have 
been able to adjust their narratives to make children from the Northern Triangle believe 
that coming to the United States will guarantee them some form of relief. The process of 
conducting a journey from the Northern Triangle to the United States involves huge risk 
(e.g., levels of violence, the train, and uncertainty). The media should portray all aspects 
of moving from one place to the other, including exposing the groups responsible for all 
the violence and the possible routes that these groups own. With a good information 
operations campaign in indigenous languages, migrants will better understand the 
challenges faced by conducting the journey north. Furthermore, this could be a possible 
deterrent factor associated with children’s decision to migrate.  
Is the United States doing enough? Is the United States trying to solve the 
problem of unaccompanied alien children migration? One interviewee from Guatemala 
now working with the U.S. Immigration system as a translator stated:  
The only thing I know is that immigration is big business. Illegals are a 
big business. The people who run the private prisons make a lot of money. 
The longer they keep you in jail (detained for UACs), the more money 
they make….There are lots more deportations now.146  
145 Ibid., 20.  
146 Terrio, Whose Child Am I?, 202.  
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This comment makes it clear that what we are doing is not working and that an 
immigration reform overhaul must occur if the United States is serious about solving the 
problem; until then, mass migration of unaccompanied alien children will continue. 
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APPENDIX. DATA 
Table 1. Unaccompanied Alien Children Encountered by Fiscal Year 
(Border Patrol Data) 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 ∑ 
Big Bend (Marfa) 197 189 168 125 256 935 
Del Rio 1014 1113 1618 2135 3268 9148 
El Centro 448 457 498 434 662 2499 
El Paso 1011 697 659 744 1029 4140 
Laredo 1570 1608 2658 3795 3800 13431 
Rio Grande Valley 4977 5236 10759 21553 49959 92484 
San Diego 980 549 524 656 954 3663 
Tucson 7998 5878 7239 9070 8262 38447 
Yuma 216 222 280 247 351 1316 
∑ 18411 15949 24403 38759 68541  
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien 
Children FY 2014,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014.  
Figure 1. United States Border Patrol Sectors Map 
Source: Office of Border Patrol Sectors in Wikimedia Commons, s.v. “CBP Sectors 
Map,” https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CBP_Sectors_Map.jpg.  
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Table 2. Relevant Data  









































110  2579  213,239  1,870  97  59  1  4 
Sonora  68  2268  476,480  2,537  89  62  1  2 
Chihuahua  213  2082  43,516  2,652  68  36  1  6 
Coahuila  90  1771  101,409  1,123  80  55  0  2 
Nuevo 
Leon 
107  1647  175,723  1,835  74  47  0  14 
Tamaulipas  112  1523  567,851  2,800  84  67  0  3 
147 Centro Nacional de Informacion, “Tasas por cada cien mil habitants 1997–2014 [Violent incidents 
per 100 thousand residents in Mexico States],” Secretario Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad 
Publica, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, accessed September 1, 2015, http://secretariadoejecutivosnsp.gob.mx/
work/models/SecretariadoEjecutivo/Resource/1/1/tasas_publicacion.pdf.  
148 “Principal Migration Routes across Mexico,” Periodico Internacional, accessed March 2, 2016, 
http://www.elperiodico.com/es/graficos/internacional/migraciones-mexico-eeuu-menores-4650/. 
149 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Total Unaccompanied Alien Children (0–17 Years Old) 
Apprehensions by Month—FY 2010–FY 2014, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, 2014, http://www.cbp.gov/
newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014. 
150 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year, U.S. Customs and 
Border Patrol, 2015, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BP%20Staffing%20FY1992-
FY2015.pdf. 
151 Current Results, “Average Annual Temperatures in Mexico,” Current Results, accessed September 
1, 2015, http://www.currentresults.com/Weather/Mexico/average-annual-temperatures.php.  
152 Ibid. 
153 Billeaud “Fence Alone Can’t Plug Porous Border.” 
154 U.S. Department of Transportation, “National Gateway and Corridor Concepts.” 
77 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
American Immigration Council. “Misplaced Priorities: Most Immigrants Deported by 
ICE in 2013 Were a Threat to No One.” 2014. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/docs/misplaced_priorities_march_2014.pdf.  
Booth, John A., Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker. Understanding Central 
America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
2015.  
Bruneau, Thomas, Lucia Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner. Maras: Gang Violence and 
Security in Central America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2013.  
Bunck, Julie, and Michael Fowler. Bribes, Bullets, and Intimidation: Drug Trafficking 
and the Law in Central America. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University, 2012.  
Byrne, Olga, and Elise Miller. “The Flow of Unaccompanied Children through the 
Immigration System.” Vera Institute of Justice. 2012. http://www.vera.org/sites/
default/files/resources/downloads/the-flow-of-unaccompanied-children-through-
the-immigration-system.pdf.  
Byrne, Olga. “Unaccompanied Children in the United States: A Literature Review.” Vera 
Institute of Justice. 2008. http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/
downloads/UAC_literature_review_FINAL.pdf.  
Carroll, Susan. “Crossing Alone: Children Fleeing to U.S. Land in a Shadowy System.” 
Houston Chronicle, May 24, 2014. http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
investigations/article/Crossing-alone-Children-fleeing-to-U-S-land-in-
5503127.php.  
Catholic Legal Immigration Network. “States and Localities that Limit Compliance with 
ICE Detainer Requests.” Catholic Legal Immigration Network. 2014. 
https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/anti-detainer_policies_11_21_14.pdf.  
Cavendish, Betsy, and Maru Cortazar. “Children at the Border: The Screening, Protection 
and Repatriation of Unaccompanied Mexican Minors.” Appleseed. 2011. 
http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Children-At-The-
Border1.pdf.  
Cheryl, Janice. U.S. International Borders: Brief Facts (CRS Report No. RS21729). 
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006.  
78 
Clunan, Anne L., and Harold A. Trinkunas. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State 
Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010.  
Corcoran, Ann. “Lutheran Family Services Rocky Mountains Largely Funded by 
Government Contracts.” Refugee Resettlement Watch. October 29, 2014. 
https://refugeeresettlementwatch.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/lutheran-family-
services-rocky-mountains-largely-funded-by-government-contracts/.  
Costa, Daniel, David Cooper, and Heidi Shierholz. “Facts about Immigration and the 
U.S. Economy.” Economic Policy Institute. August 2014. http://www.epi.org/
publication/immigration-facts/#unaccompanied-migrant-children.  
Coulter, Ann. Adios, America! The Left’s Plan to Turn Our Country into a Third World 
Hellhole. Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2015.  
Dominguez, Rodrigo. “Central American Migrants and La Bestia: The Route, Dangers, 
and Government Responses.” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2014. 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-migrants-and-la-bestia-
route-dangers-and-government-responses.  
Elbein, Saul. “Guatemalans Aren’t Just Fleeing Gangs.” New Republic Magazine, July 
13, 2014. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118675/child-migrants-guatemala-
are-fleeing-more-just-gang-violence.  
Farah, Douglas, and Pamela Phillips. “Central American Gangs and Transnational 
Criminal Organizations: The Changing Relationships in a Time of Turmoil.” 
Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2013. 
http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20130224_CenAmGangsandTCOs.pdf.  
Fox, William P. “Multi-Attribute Decision Making in Risk Analysis.” In Analyzing Risk 
through Probabilistic Modeling in Operations Research, edited by Dariusz Jacek 
Jakóbczak, 255–302. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2015.  
Garcia, Maricela. “Unaccompanied Children in the United States: Challenges and 
Opportunities.” Providence, RI: Latino Policy Institute. 2008. 
http://www.latinopolicyforum.org/resources/document/Unaccompanied-Children-
Article.pdf.  
Garcia, Mercedes. “Alliance for Prosperity Plan in the Norther Triangle: Not Likely a 
Final Solution for the Central American Migration Crisis.” Washington, DC: 




Georgopoulos, Areti. “Beyond the Reach of Juvenile Justice: The Crisis Facing 
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children Detained by the United States.” Law and 
Inequality Journal 23 (2004): 117–155.  
Gordon, Ian. “70,000 Kids Will Show Up Alone at Our Border This Year. What Happens 
to Them?” Mother Jones, July–August 2014. http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2014/06/child-migrants-surge-unaccompanied-central-america.  
Government Accountability Office. “Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered 
Various Factors in Funding Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in 
Achieving Interagency Objectives.” Washington, DC: Government 
Accountability Office, 2013. http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658145.pdf.  
Greenblatt, Alan. “What’s Causing the Latest Immigration Crisis? A Brief Explainer.” 
NPR, July 9, 2014. http://www.npr.org/2014/07/09/329848538/whats-causing-
the-latest-immigration-crisis-a-brief-explainer.  
Havoscope. “Prices Charged by Human Smugglers.” 2016. http://www.havocscope.com/
black-market-prices/human-smuggling-fees/.  
Immigration Policy Center. “Authority of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agents: 
An Overview.” 2012. http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
CBP_Overview_022112.pdf.  
International Crisis Group. “Guatemala: Drug Trafficking and Violence.” Latin America 
Report No. 9. International Crisis Group. 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
regions/latin-america-caribbean/guatemala/139-guatemala-drug-trafficking-and-
violence.aspx.  
Isacson, Adam. Mexico’s Other Border: Security, Migration, and the Humanitarian 
Crisis at the line with Central America. Washington, DC: Washington Office of 
Latin America, 2014.  
Kandel, William, and Lisa Seghetti. “Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview.” 
(CRS Report No. R43599) Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43599.pdf.  
Khashu, Anita. “Children in Transit: Results of Interviews with Central American 
Unaccompanied Minors Encountered in Mexico.” Mexico City: Centro de 
Estudios y Programas Interamericanos [Center of Inter-American Studies and 
Programs]. 2010. http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_papers/
21KHASHU.pdf.  
Lakhani, Nina. “Mexico Deports Record Numbers of Women and Children in US-driven 
Effort.” The Guardian, February 4, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/feb/04/mexico-deports-record-numbers-women-children-central-america.  
80 
Lutheran Immigration and Refuge Service. “Flores Settlement Agreement & DHS 
Custody.” Baltimore, MD: Lutheran Immigration and Refuge Service, 2014. 
http://lirs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Flores-Family-Detention-
Backgrounder-LIRS-WRC-KIND-FINAL1.pdf.  
Makalusky, Joseph M. “Reno v. Flores: A Violation of International Law?” New England 
Law Boston 2, no. 1 (1996). http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/nejicl/vol2/
reno.htm#N_1_.   
Martinez, Oscar. The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail. 
New York: Verso, 2013.  
Meyer, Josh. “Drug Cartels Raise the Stakes on Human Smuggling.” Los Angeles Times, 
March 23, 2009. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/23/nation/na-human-
smuggling.  
Periodico Internacional. “Principal Migration Routes across Mexico.” Accessed March 
2, 2016. http://www.elperiodico.com/es/graficos/internacional/migraciones-
mexico-eeuu-menores-4650/.  
Ribando Seelke, Clare. Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations (R42917). Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 
Rosemblum, Marc R. Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension 
between Protection and Prevention. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 
2015.  
Rosenblum, Marc R., and Isabel Ball. “Trend in Unaccompanied Child and Family 
Migration from Central America.” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 
2016. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/trends-unaccompanied-child-and-
family-migration-central-america.  
Seelke, Clare R., and Kristin Finklea. “U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida 
Initiative and Beyond” (CRS Report No. R41349).Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2016. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R41349.pdf.  
Sullivan, John. “Narco Cities: Mexico and Beyond.” Small Wars Journal, March 31, 
2014. http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/15483.  
Taverna, Jessica G. “Did the Government Finally, Get it Right? An Analysis of the 
Former INS, the Office of Refugee Resettlement and Unaccompanied Minor 
Aliens’ Due Process Rights.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 12 (2004): 
939–978.  
Terrio, Susan J. Whose Child Am I?: Unaccompanied, Undocumented Children in U.S. 
Custody. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015.  
81 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Crime and Development in Central 
America: Caught in the Crossfire.” New York: United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, 2007. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Central%20America%20Study.pdf.  
U.S. Border Patrol. “United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and 
Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016.” U.S. Border 
Patrol. 2016. http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-
unaccompanied-children.  
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. The Lost Dream: Unaccompanied Migrant 
Children and Victims of Human Trafficking on the US/Mexico Border. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2006.  
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “Border Patrol Agent Staffing by Fiscal Year.” U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol. 2015. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/BP%20Staffing%20FY1992-FY2015.pdf.  
———. “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children FY 2016.” U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection. 2016. http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-
border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2016.  
———. “Total Unaccompanied Alien Children (0–17 Years Old) Apprehensions by 
Month—FY 2010–FY 2014.” U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. 2014. 
http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children/
fy-2014.  
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. “Children Entering the United States 
Unaccompanied: Placement in ORR Care Provider Facilities.” Office of Refugee 
and Resettlement. 2015. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/children-
entering-the-united-states-unaccompanied-section-1#1.3.  
U.S. Department of Justice. “Immigration Court Cases Involving Unaccompanied Alien 
Children.” Washington, DC: Executive Office of Immigration Review, 2004. 
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/
EOIR%20guideline%20on%20Children%20in%20immigration%20court.pdf.  
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Unaccompanied Juveniles in 
INS Custody. Report no. I-2001-009. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Justice, 2001.  
U.S. Department of Transportation. “National Gateway and Corridor Concepts.” U.S. 




U.S. Department of Treasury. “Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal 
Organization.” U.S. Department of Treasury. October 11, 2012. 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1733.aspx.  
U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. “Responding to Violence in 
Central America.” Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Caucus on International 
Narcotics Control, 2011. http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/ 
files/serve?File_id=a67575d5-66dd-4e36-a4ae-6a4f70de500a.  
White House. “Fact Sheet: The Secure Fence Act of 2006.” October 2006, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061026-
1.html.  
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Fact Sheet: United States and Central 
America: Honoring our Commitments.” White House Office of the Press 
Secretary. January 14, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/
01/15/fact-sheet-united-states-and-central-america-honoring-our-commitments.  
Wolf, Sonja. “Creating Folk Devils: Street Gang Representations in El Salvador’s Print 
Media.” Journal of Human Security 8, no. 2 (2012): 36–63.  
Wolgin, Philip E., and Angela Maria Kelley. “5 Things You Need to Know About 
Unaccompanied Children.” Center for American Progress. June 18, 2014. 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2014/06/18/92056.  
Women’s Refugee Commission. “Forced From Home: The Lost Boys and Girls of 
Central America.” Women’s Refugee Commission. 2012. 
https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/component/zdocs/
document?id=844-forced-from-home-the-lost-boys-and-girls-of-central-america.  
Western Hemisphere Forum. “Evolving Threats in Central America: Forecasting an 
Uncertain Future.” Livestream. April 2012. http://original.livestream.com/chds/ 
video?clipId=pla_9a49830d-71ac-48ae-9875-
8c18800f6625&utm_source=lslibrary&utm_medium=ui-thumb.  
Zill, Oriana, and Lowell Bergman. “Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
 
